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Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Cen-
tralized Coordination in a Networked World 
Randal C. Picker† 
 
The en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft1 partially overturning 
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson’s findings of liability and fully rejecting 
his proposed break-up remedy sets the stage for a full reset. As discussed 
below, the appellate court upheld in large measure the lower court’s find-
ing of monopoly maintenance in violation of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act; 
overturned the finding of attempted monopolization of the browser mar-
ket; and remanded for a rule of reason analysis of Microsoft’s alleged tying 
of Internet Explorer to Windows. The liability ruling alone would have 
sufficed to require remand for reconsideration of the appropriate remedy, 
but the appeals court also found the remedy process deficient and found 
that Judge Jackson’s out-of-court statements gave the appearance of bias. 
These provided additional sufficient reasons for overturning the remedy, 
and the extra-judicial statements sufficed to give Judge Jackson the boot 
on the remand. 
Putting to one side possible appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court,2 
the ruling therefore means that a new federal district court judge will need 
to conduct a hearing on remedy, and the federal government and the 
plaintiff States will need to consider whether to pursue the tying claim on 
remand. Microsoft has already indicated that it would like to settle, on the 
                                                 
† Copyright © 2001, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Paul and Theo Leffmann 
Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Senior Fellow, 
The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Labora-
tory. At the Conference, this paper was given under the name of “Understanding Micro-
soft: The Decline of Centralized Coordination in a Peer-to-Peer World.” I thank confer-
ence commentators Christoph Engel and Ulrich Kamecke, as well as Richard Epstein, 
Jack Goldsmith, Douglas G. Lichtman, Micheal O’Donnell and participants at a Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School workshop. I also thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation and 
the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation for their generous research support. 
1 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 2001) (en banc). 
2 The United States and the plaintiff States have indicated that they will not ask the Su-
preme Court to review the ruling. See Appellees’ Motion for Immediate Issuance of 
Mandate (filed with the D.C. Circuit on July 13, 2001). As discussed below, on July 18, 
2001, Microsoft sought rehearing before the D.C. Circuit on one issue. In its July 20, 
2001 Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Immediate Issuance of the Mandate, Micro-
soft indicated that it might seek Supreme Court review but would do so only after the 
D.C. Circuit had resolved the petition for rehearing. 
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right terms of course, and there is some reason to think that the Bush An-
titrust Division would be willing as well. (The States are another matter, 
though New Mexico has already jumped in and settled.) 
Given the reset, what should happen? How should we think about 
an appropriate remedy for the monopoly maintenance violation? How 
should the tying claim play out under a rule of reason analysis? What pro-
visions should be central to any possible settlement? This paper offers 
thoughts on these questions. It rests on three basic premises: 
1. Software sharing is the norm. By this I mean that one piece of soft-
ware will look to another piece of software for some of its func-
tionality. Without intending too much by these words, one “appli-
cation” might look to another “application” or an “application” 
might look to the “operating system” for this shared code. 
2. Software sharing must be coordinated. Programmers make the initial 
sharing decision through their design decisions. A program could 
be self-contained and rely on nothing else. That could be accom-
plished either through writing all of the relevant code or by bun-
dling the new code with the code to be shared. Bundling by the 
programmer is one form of coordination. If full bundling turns out 
not to be sensible—and it often will not—coordination will need to 
be achieved through other means. For if a program anticipates that 
another program will be present, and it is not, the first program 
will fail. A person buying the first program must therefore have ac-
cess to the second program. Put differently, the first program must 
be coordinated with the second program. 
3. The Internet has altered the cost of coordination. The rise of the Inter-
net, and more generally, networked computers, has drastically 
changed the cost of software coordination. More precisely, decen-
tralized coordination was prohibitively costly prior to the Internet. 
This forced us to rely instead on centralized coordination—in 
many ways, the Windows operating system. Now, networked co-
ordination or peer-to-peer coordination—of both distribution and 
payment—is possible. 
These premises push me towards the following conclusions: 
1. Windows as Hub. Centralized coordination was achieved most 
straightforwardly through direct incorporation of the shared code 
into the operating system and naturally accounts for much of the 
growth of the size and scope of Windows. Pre-Internet, this en-
sured that required shared software would be available for pro-
grams added later. It also ensured that only one payment was 
made for this shared software. 
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2. Incorporating IE. A decision to incorporate a browser would have 
been perfectly consistent with this prior practice. 
3. Understanding Tying. In this framework, the question of tying 
turns not on some elusive conception of “separate” or “integrated” 
software, but rather on the assignment of the role of coordinator 
for shared software. Again, in the pre-network era, such an as-
signment would flow naturally to the hub. 
4. The Network Changes Everything. This changes dramatically in the 
network era. Decentralized coordination of shared software is in-
creasingly possible. This would make it possible to radically resize 
the operating system. We can easily envision a new, smaller cen-
tralized OS, supplemented by additional software acquired through 
networked coordination. 
We have therefore reached a breakpoint. The prior need for cen-
tralized coordination should make us skeptical about the government’s 
pending tying claim against Microsoft. If that is right, the plaintiffs are left 
“only” with the core ruling on monopoly maintenance. We have a blank 
slate on the remedy for that violation. The suggested shift in coordination 
possibilities should guide us in crafting that remedy. Given the finding of 
monopoly maintenance, the government may be able to jump in now and 
facilitate the shift from centralized coordination to networked coordina-
tion. To date, I don’t think that the government has understood that its 
remedies should be directed at the suggested coordination shift, though 
some of the conduct remedies at least might have that consequence; the 
suggested and still possible break-up almost certainly would not. 
On a going forward basis, we should have substantial doubts about 
Microsoft’s need to incorporate new code into the operating system on a 
mandatory basis. Given Microsoft’s now demonstrated willingness to use 
its control over Windows to preserve its Windows monopoly, we need to 
construct a framework to prevent further abuses of the sort seen in this 
case. That framework also needs to reflect the substantial difficulties of 
identifying in advance precisely what new features might emerge as po-
tential competitors to the operating system. 
Section V sets out the suggested remedy in detail, but a remedy 
should consist of five central features: 
1. DI Visibility Flexibility. There should be no mandatory icons on 
the Windows desktop or spots reserved in the Start Menu or its 
equivalent. Distribution intermediaries (DIs)—original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) and others—would have complete free-
dom to add or subtract icons from the interface. 
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2. Mandatory Versioning. During the remedial period—see 5 below—
Microsoft should be required to issue Windows versions with and 
without any new middleware that it adds to Windows. For this to 
be meaningful, this means that the baseline Windows XP could 
not include instant messaging and the Windows media player, but 
that those features could be included in an upgraded version of 
Windows XP. Microsoft could charge the same price for basic and 
deluxe versions of Windows. 
3. Direct Distribution Only Period. For a moratorium period, perhaps 
of six months to 2 years, Microsoft should be able to distribute 
through distributional intermediaries only the baseline Windows 
without the new middleware. Microsoft would be able to distribute 
such middleware only through downloading from its website or 
through direct distribution of CDs to end-users. 
4. DI Neutrality. After the moratorium period, we should rely on 
competition among software producers and others for DI “shelf 
space”—hard disk space for OEMs, web presence for Internet ser-
vice providers and others—to control software distribution abuses, 
and should only seek to control possible abuses of market power by 
limiting conditions that Microsoft can impose on DIs. Mandatory 
versioning would be continued during this second period. 
5. Sunset. All of these provisions should sunset, perhaps after a period 
of three years. 
In two sentences, Microsoft distorted the distribution of software through 
its monopoly maintenance; the right remedy for that it is to distort back 
against Microsoft for a period, and then make sure that Microsoft is not 
able to distort distribution again. The presence of the always-on network 
means that we can do this while minimizing possible harms to consumers 
from introducing a corrective distortion. That said, the direct distribution 
remedy may impose interim losses on consumers for uncertain later con-
sumer gains. We need to be sure we are willing to make that investment, 
and that turns in part on whether we think that we can restore competi-
tion without the direct distribution remedy. 
I. A Quick Introduction to the Case 
In United States v. Microsoft,3 Judge Jackson reached four legal conclu-
sions: 
                                                 
3 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Findings of Fact”); 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 
2000) (“Conclusions of Law”); 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Final Judgment”). 
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1. Microsoft maintained its Windows monopoly by anticompetitive 
means in violation of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act; 
2. Microsoft attempted to monopolize the Web browser market, also 
in violation of Sec. 2; 
3. Microsoft impermissibly tied Internet Explorer (IE) to Windows 
in violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act; and  
4. Microsoft did not engage in illegal exclusive dealing. 
These conclusions obviously depended on subsidiary legal findings, includ-
ing those covering market definition. 
In many ways, the three violations found by Judge Jackson turn on 
the legitimacy of Microsoft’s decision to distribute IE with Windows. Re-
gardless of what one thinks of the legal conclusions, Judge Jackson was 
certainly correct in seeing Microsoft’s decision as having important conse-
quences for competition between Microsoft and Netscape. In his now in-
famous May 26, 1995 memo on “The Internet Tidal Wave,” Bill Gates 
feared that Netscape was playing a platform strategy that would “com-
moditize” the operating system.4 Developers would write software directly 
to the Netscape layer and would cease to write to the underlying OS. 
Control would shift from Microsoft to Netscape. Microsoft could drive a 
stake in the heart of that strategy by fragmenting the browser market, and 
did so when IE captured a substantial market share. The attempted mo-
nopolization claim turns largely on the details of a June, 1995 meeting 
among assorted Netscape and Microsoft employees, plus Microsoft’s suc-
cess in displacing Navigator with IE. And the decision to distribute IE 
with Windows makes it possible to allege that they have been tied to-
gether. 
The D.C. Circuit’s through-going review of Judge Jackson’s opin-
ion left only the monopoly maintenance claim intact. The claim of at-
tempted monopolization of the browser market was killed off completely: 
the lower court’s finding was overturned and the claim was not sent back 
to the lower court for reconsideration. The tying claim was overturned 
and remanded for consideration under rule of reason analysis. Each of 
these will be discussed in more detail below. 
                                                 
4 Govt. Ex. 20 at 4 (“A new competitor ‘born’ on the Internet is Netscape. Their browser 
is dominant, with 70% usage share, allowing them to determine which network exten-
sions will catch on. They are pursuing a multi-platform strategy where they move the key 
API into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system”). 
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II. Shared Software and Software Coordination 
Before doing so, focus on two standard software sharing situations. One 
possibility is that two pieces of software will have a common component, 
best captured as a file with the same name. (This is no guarantee, of 
course, that files having the same name have the same content, but ignore 
that here.) Another way in which software can share code is by having 
one application rely on the expected presence of other software. This may 
be as basic as relying on the printer drivers provided with Windows in 
your word processing application. We could think of these as software ex-
ternalities. 
For ease of discussion, label the first version of sharing the com-
mon component case, the second the expected component case, and start 
with the first. Installation—and deinstallation, as we need to consider both 
of these—creates the risk of corruption if the common component is actu-
ally shared by the two packages. Package 1 is added to the system; pack-
age 2 is added thereafter. If both packages use precisely the same version 
of the shared component and look to the same file path for the compo-
nent, we have avoided some basic problems. If not, we may overwrite an 
old component with a new component (or vice versa) and break one of 
the packages. Deinstallation creates similar issues: If package 2 uninstalls 
the common component, package 1 won’t work. In the software business, 
this is referred to as “DLL hell,” as many of the relevant files are stored in 
files known as dynamic link libraries (DLLs). In the expected component 
case, again, the software may not work at all and certainly won’t work as 
planned if the expected component is missing. You can write words on the 
screen but you can’t print, if the printer drivers that the word processor 
looks for are missing. 
In both of these cases, we have a natural alternative: have each ap-
plication bring all of its components with it. Indeed, this has been a com-
mon practice on the Unix platform.5 This of course would increase the 
size of each application, quite dramatically in some cases. It also poses in-
teresting licensing questions. For example, suppose that Microsoft licensed 
Windows to every application developer who wanted to rely on the Win-
dows infrastructure for its applications. Windows and the application 
would be distributed together, thereby ensuring the necessary OS for run-
ning the application. This poses pricing problems. Do I have to rebuy the 
OS with each application? Should the application test for the presence of 
                                                 
5 See Rick Anderson, The End of DLL Hell, January, 2000 (available at 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-
us/dnw2k/html/dlldanger1.asp) 
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the OS already, and not charge you for the OS if you already have it? 
How do we make that system work when software is distributed on CDs 
and floppies and not over the Internet? 
A. Minimizing the Operating System and the Windows Installer 
Try a thought experiment: Suppose we wanted to minimize the operating 
system. How far could we shrink and what would be the consequences of 
doing this?6 We can get a handle on this by delving into an obscure piece 
of Windows 2000, a tool called the Windows Installer (WI). The Win-
dows Installer implements key related concepts—just-in-time software, 
installation on demand and “advertisement”—which in turn help to make 
clear what the minimalist operating system might look like.7 
As you might guess, absent perverse naming, the Windows In-
staller would be a tool for installing software, and, of course, it is. It estab-
lishes a unified framework for installation—and deinstallation—of new 
software on a computer running the Windows 2000 operating system. 
One of the key issues in adding and removing software is the manage-
ment of shared software. Software sharing, of course, in some sense de-
fines the software business. When we think of an operating system as 
serving as a platform for a large number of application programs, we mean 
that the applications share that operating system. Each application need 
not come with its own operating system but instead can rely on the exis-
tence of certain basic functionalities from the OS. 
WI creates new possibilities in installation. The standard binary 
choice—the component is installed or it isn’t installed—is replaced with a 
richer structure that allows installation of software as and when needed. 
Features are “advertised,” meaning that the software displays the feature 
in question as available for use, but the actual software to implement the 
feature is not already installed. When the user tries to use the feature, the 
installer obtains the software, usually by asking the user to insert an origi-
                                                 
6 Operating system theorists might object that we should focus on the microkernel when 
looking for the smallest element of an OS, though I gather this is a contested issue. See, 
e.g., William Stallings, Operating Systems 172-78 (4th ed. 2001); Andrew S. Ta-
nenbaum, Modern Operating Systems 62 (2nd ed. 2001). I intend the OS notion in the 
text to be less precise and more conceptual, I hope without doing serious damage to lan-
guage. 
7 This discussion is based on Microsoft’s white paper “The Windows Installer Service,” 
(available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/howitworks/management/installer.as
p). 
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nal Windows 2000 CD—and loads it at that point. This is installation on 
demand (IOD) or just-in-time software. 
IOD works at the feature level. For example, I recently received an 
email from an Israeli student, which, in turn, used a Hebrew font. It 
wasn’t already on my machine, but the computer realized that, and asked 
me to load it. Advertising could work at the application level itself, so that 
when I first try to use an application, say PowerPoint, the entire applica-
tion is loaded. 
In this framework, we can naturally distinguish advertising (or 
visibility), which relates to whether a particular feature is visible to the 
user, and presence, which relates to whether or not software has been in-
stalled on the computer or is directly available for use across a network. 
Software can be visible without being present, indeed, that is the core idea 
of installation on demand. Software could also be present without being 
visible: an end-user would not see how to invoke the software directly but 
a software developer could rely on the presence of the software for sharing 
when designing complementary software. We should also distinguish be-
tween presence and ownership: software could be installed but unowned; 
first use of the software might trigger a request for payment to be made 
across the network. 
We can now define the minimalist operating system. It has no 
functionality other than advertising features and applications. It also will 
maintain a database of the locations of advertised software. You want to 
browse the Internet? You click on the browser icon on the desktop, and 
install a browser (which browser?). You want help understanding the 
desktop, go to the advertised help feature, which in turn will require the 
loading of content and a display engine. Email? Word processing? It all 
operates the same way. The minimalist operating system does little more 
than provide access points to features and applications and uses the Win-
dows Installer to manage the installation on a demand basis. 
B. OEMs and OS Fragmentation 
We should examine how software was distributed in the pre-network era. 
Software was installed by a computer seller—an original equipment 
manufacturer or OEM in the trade—at the time of the purchase of a new 
computer, and by end-users off of CDs and floppies when new software 
was purchased. OEMs dealt directly with software vendors, such as Mi-
crosoft and others. Microsoft defends its decisions regarding IE from the 
broad position that software developers, not courts, need to be in charge of 
innovation. Microsoft also argues more narrowly that by bundling to-
gether software in the operating system and insisting that each user have 
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the same platform, it creates standards that redound to the benefit of all 
consumers. Software developers, at least as a group, rely on the presence 
of all of the components of the operating system in developing their 
applications. Losing a component means breaking an application. 
Allowing OEMs to install some pieces of the OS and excluded others will 
result in a “fragmented” installed base for the operating system. With a 
fragmented OS—with multiple flavors—application developers must 
create multiple versions of their application or ignore groups of potential 
users. Examine this concern in the framework of our two basic software 
sharing scenarios: common components and expected components. Con-
sumers do not want to pay twice for the same piece of software. In the 
common component case—if managed correctly—the consumer needs 
only one copy of the component and does want to pay two software 
houses for it. We now need to coordinate distribution of the single copy of 
the component. With an extremely fined-grained setup for distributing 
software, we could do this in a number of ways. All software is installed 
over the network. When the consumer purchases software package A, the 
installer searches the consumer’s computer to see if any components re-
quired for the package are already installed. Finding none, a full installa-
tion is done for package A and the full price is charged for the software. 
Time passes and the consumer seeks to buy software package B. The in-
staller searches for common components and finds the components that 
overlap between A and B. Package B is installed, but only the new com-
ponents, and the price charged for the software reflects the fact that the 
common components were not sold in the second installation. 
This requires an enormous amount of coordination. In the pre-
network era—pre-Internet really—there was no way to engage in this sort 
of real-time coordination of distribution and payment. Software was sold 
on CDs and the price for that software was paid in exchange for and at 
the time of the physical transfers of the CD. Networked coordination of 
the sort possible in the network software distribution model was difficult. 
It would have been possible to use a lock and key system, requiring a tele-
phone call and payment to purchase a code to unlock the software, but this 
is somewhat clunky. Instead, we needed to rely on centralized coordina-
tion of the hub-and-spoke variety with Windows at the hub. We avoided 
multiple purchases of the same software by assigning the sale of common 
components to the central hub. These components were distributed as 
part of the operating system, so as to facilitate coordination, rather than as 
somehow being an inherently necessary part of the OS. 
In the pre-Internet era, we could think of OEMs as playing the 
key role in software coordination. In the abstract, OEMs could treat Win-
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dows as an input, and they could subtract at will, and then add other soft-
ware. In the pre-network era, this would have worked poorly. Software 
was distributed on floppies or CDs, and not over the network. If a soft-
ware developer anticipated that software would be present on the con-
sumer’s machine, the developer would not bundle that software with its 
software. When that supposition turned out to be wrong, the new soft-
ware would crash. Absent a network connection, there would be no way 
to add that component on an as-needed basis. In that world, fragmenta-
tion of the OS is a serious concern. 
We have been discussing the common component case with shar-
ing between peer applications. The expected component case is more hi-
erarchical, where the second piece of software is more fundamentally de-
pendent on the first. In the expected component case, if that component is 
missing, WI just reaches out to get the necessary component. If an OEM 
hasn’t installed the component that the application needs, the WI solves 
that problem by adding the component as needed. Again, with always-on 
networks, this is easy to solve. The rise of the ubiquitous network changes 
the costs of coordination dramatically. Networked component sharing be-
comes possible in a technical sense, and the real question relates to the 
cost of coordinating the markets in these transactions. 
It is even easy to address with standalone computers, so long as the 
Windows CD distributed with the computer contains the missing compo-
nent, even if the OEM chose not to install it originally. Of course, if we 
think of the OEM as buying some subset of the Windows OS and the 
end-user receiving only that subset on the CD, we then have a problem. 
The end-user will need to enter into a separate transaction with Microsoft 
to buy the needed component, and, again, pre-network, that transaction is 
quite expensive. Microsoft would need to prepare a missing components 
CD for each OEM, and arrange to distribute those through retailers. 
The alternative is that the Windows CD contains all of the com-
ponents, even if OEMs can choose to make visible only a subset of that 
Windows functionality. IOD would then add missing functionality on as 
needed basis as an application looked for that functionality. Of course in 
that framework, OEMs would seek to pay for as little of Windows as pos-
sible, given that consumers would receive the entire package anyway. 
III. Monopoly Maintenance and the Limits of Centralized Coordination 
of Software Sharing 
In the pre-network era, the OS emerges naturally as the key device for 
implementing software sharing coordination. Microsoft policed that coor-
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dination by insisting on full availability of Windows. That of course gave 
Microsoft enormous power, as Windows itself emerged as the dominant 
vehicle for software distribution. In the pre-network period, the need for 
centralized coordination gave Microsoft a bottleneck power, the ability to 
include and at least partially exclude simply through inclusion or exclusion 
from Windows. 
Obviously, as the central coordinator, Microsoft could just include 
IE with Windows, which in turn gives rise to the tying claim in the case. 
But Microsoft went beyond this by giving others access to Windows in an 
effort to influence their use of Navigator. Microsoft also used its control 
over software design to disadvantage Netscape. This is what drives the 
monopoly maintenance claim in the case. Microsoft used its control over 
access to Windows not merely to continue to coordinate software sharing 
but to affirmatively prevent Netscape from succeeding. The irony here is 
that inclusion of IE into Windows might have sufficed to protect the ap-
plications barrier to entry as conceived of in the case, and the contractual 
efforts aimed directly at Netscape were probably overkill. 
The standard approach to monopolization under Sec. 2 of the 
Sherman Act was set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grin-
nell Corp.: “The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has 
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant mar-
ket and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident.”8 The appeals court upheld “in 
its entirety” the lower court’s conclusion that Microsoft exercised monop-
oly power in the market for Intel-compatible computers.9 
Monopoly in hand, the monopoly maintenance claim is straight-
forward and turns on Microsoft’s role as centralized coordinator. The 
maintenance claim itself rested on four separate allegations: (1) contrac-
tual dealings with a blizzard of abbreviations—OEMs, IAPs, ICPs and 
ISVs—and those with Apple and Intel; (2) integration of IE and Win-
dows; (3) efforts to subvert Java; and (4) Microsoft’s course of conduct as a 
whole.10 The appeals court rejected the latter claim as insufficiently devel-
oped,11 but upheld, in whole or in part, the lower court’s ruling on the 
other three allegations. 
                                                 
8 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966). See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Co., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n. 19 (1985). 
9 Opinion at 15. 
10 Opinion at 25-26. 
11 Opinion at 58-59. 
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A. Contractual Dealings 
The appeals court in the main upheld the lower court’s analysis of the 
contracts: 
o AGREEMENTS WITH OEMS. Microsoft barred OEMs from 
changing desktop icons or folders or the menu entries under the 
“Start” Menu. Microsoft also did not allow the OEMs to alter the 
sequence of screens viewed when the computer booted initially, 
nor did it allow the OEMs to substitute another interface shell for 
Windows itself (here thinking of Windows, as it was originally, as 
an overlay for DOS). The appeals court found each of these re-
strictions, save for the last, anticompetitive without any counter-
vailing justification. For example, Microsoft’s insistence that the 
icon for Internet Explorer be visible on the desktop made it less 
likely that OEMs would install Navigator as well, since, as the 
lower court found and Microsoft did not successfully challenge on 
appeal, two icons might create consumer confusion, and confused 
consumers call their OEMs first. Alterations in the boot sequence 
might make it possible for OEMs to promote rival browsers. In 
separating icon removal or alteration of the boot sequence from 
wholesale replacement of the Windows shell, the appeals court 
emphasized that the latter made substantial alterations to Micro-
soft’s copyrighted work, while the former made only minor 
changes. 
o AGREEMENTS WITH IAPS. The court of appeals blessed Micro-
soft’s efforts to attract Internet access providers (IAPs) to IE by 
giving it and the Internet Explorer Access Kit to them gratis and 
by paying IAPs for getting their users to adopt IE. These agree-
ments became anticompetitive when they included direct limits on 
loading Navigator, as this, in the view of the court, partially fore-
closed one of the two key modes of distributing browser software. 
Microsoft’s failure to offer a procompetitive justification for these 
limits sealed its fate. 
o DEALS WITH ICPS AND ISVS. The court of appeals rejected liabil-
ity for Microsoft’s deals with Internet content providers (ICPs), as 
these agreements were not shown to have had a substantial effect 
upon competition. The court reached a contrary conclusion for 
Microsoft’s dealings with independent software vendors (ISVs). 
Microsoft had agreed to give preferential access to early versions of 
Windows 98 and the next version of Windows NT to the ISVs in 
exchange for an agreement to use Internet Explorer as the default 
software for HTML-based materials. The lower court concluded 
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that these agreements foreclosed Netscape from an important 
channel for distributing Navigator, and the appeals court found 
this to show a prima facie case of monopoly maintenance, and 
again Microsoft offered a minimal procompetitive justification. 
o DEAL WITH APPLE. The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s 
finding the Microsoft had behaved anti-competitively in threaten-
ing to cancel the Mac version of Office if Apple did not bundle IE 
with Mac OS and make it the default browser. 
o DEALS RELATING TO JAVA. The court of appeals reversed the 
lower court’s ruling that Microsoft acted illegally in creating an in-
compatible version of the Java virtual machine (JVM) in competi-
tion with Sun’s version of the JVM. Incompatibility alone did not 
violate the Sherman Act, and the court understood the competitive 
benefits of having multiple versions of the JVM. This is true even 
if Microsoft’s strategic reason for incompatibility was to fragment 
the Java market. But the court of appeals upheld lower court rul-
ings on deception in the marketing of Microsoft’s Java authoring 
software; on de facto exclusivity in certain agreements for the dis-
tribution of Navigator, which in turn blocked the distribution of 
Sun’s JVM; and on Microsoft’s anticompetitive threats to Intel on 
a possible Intel JVM. 
As the court of appeals concluded, Microsoft cut deals with a vari-
ety of industry players to give them special access to Windows in exchange 
for their support of IE and limitations on their use of Navigator. In doing 
so, Microsoft stepped beyond its assigned role of hub, both by including 
software in Windows for reasons that had little to do with consumer satis-
faction and by using its control over Windows to tilt the competitive play-
ing field against Netscape. 
Microsoft repeatedly incorporated new features into Windows that 
allowed it offer special placement to other companies. Doing so takes the 
idea of “advertising” discussed above in connection with the Windows In-
staller and applies it quite literally to the Windows desktop. Two features, 
the online service providers folder and the Channel Bar, are of particular 
note. The Windows desktop advertised, actually quite literally, Internet 
service providers, including America Online. The Channel Bar advertised 
content providers. It was precisely the ability to advertise on the Windows 
desktop that created leverage for Microsoft in its effort to attract users to 
Internet Explorer away from Netscape Navigator. 
In these cases, Microsoft was able to use its control over Windows 
to create scarcity and then to use that scarcity as a lever against Netscape. 
Start with scarcity. To understand Microsoft’s incentives, it is useful to 
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keep in mind an example known as the card game.12 Contrast two ver-
sions. In the first, one person holds five black cards, while five other indi-
viduals each hold one red card. Each successful pairing of a black and red 
card is worth $100, and that value can be split in whatever fashion agreed 
to by the cardholders. We can’t be sure what will happen here, but we 
might guess that we would get five matches, and roughly a 50/50 split of 
the value. The black card monopolist would get $250 and each red card 
holder would get $50, for a total of $250 going to the red card holders. 
Now suppose that the black card holder destroyed one black card. 
How would this change the outcome? It is clear that society is worse off. 
We can now only get four matches for a total of $400 in value. Nonethe-
less, our black card monopolist may do better. How? One holder of a red 
card is going to get left out. Imagine that tentative deals have been struck 
with four red card holders with a 50/50 division. The red card holder on 
the sidelines has every incentive to jump in and offer a different split, say 
60/40, to at least get something from his red card. Of course that would 
just exclude a different red card holder, who in turn would offer a better 
deal to the black card monopolist. When black cards are scarce, the black 
card monopolist has enormous bargaining power through its ability to play 
one red card holder off against another. This bargaining power was cre-
ated by creating artificial scarcity. The very act of making the overall pie 
smaller gives a bigger piece to the monopolist. 
This is artificial scarcity at work. It would have been easy enough 
to have just put the ten largest ISPs into the online folder with appropriate 
code to sign up with the ISPs. Hard disk space isn’t at a premium. Getting 
the code right would have been some work, though the ISPs would cer-
tainly have been delighted to bear the costs. Customers would have had 
many choices highlighted for them in a straightforward way. But this 
would not have worked in Microsoft’s interests. Microsoft would not have 
been able to extract a commitment from AOL regarding support for IE. 
Microsoft took exactly the same line with AT&T when it was seeking in-
clusion in the online folders.13 
Look at the case of AOL in more detail. David Colburn, Senior 
Vice President for Business Affairs of America Online, testified that AOL 
feared that its business would be substantially undercut by the bundling of 
Microsoft’s new online service, MSN, with Windows 95. Control over 
                                                 
12 For more on the card game, see Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-
opetition 41-43 (1996). 
13 See United States v. Microsoft Trial Transcript, October 19, 1998 A.M. Session, 73-
75 (available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/transcripts/oct98/1019a.doc). 
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Windows gives Microsoft control over the best possible distribution chan-
nel for software, plus Microsoft can give that software prominent place-
ment by sticking an icon for it on the Windows desktop. 
AOL desperately wanted something to match this distribution and 
placement. It had built its business through “carpet bombing,” that is, mass 
distribution of AOL floppies and CDs, where only 1-2% of those receiv-
ing the CDs would ever become AOL customers (how many of these 
have you thrown out?).14 Microsoft offered an unmatchable inducement 
to adopt Microsoft’s Internet browser and to reject that of Netscape: 
placement of an AOL icon in an “online services” folder on the Windows 
desktop and distribution with Windows of the code required to sign up 
with AOL. As a result, on March 12, 1996, Microsoft and AOL signed 
an agreement in which AOL agreed to, in Colburn’s words, “virtual exclu-
sivity in favor of Internet Explorer on AOL.”15 AOL could ship a browser 
other than Internet Explorer only when required to do so by a third party, 
and after AOL had taken all “reasonable efforts” to induce the third party 
to use Internet Explorer, plus there was an absolute cap that non-Internet 
Explorer shipments were limited to less than 15% of AOL’s total browser 
shipments. 
Microsoft can and does manipulate this scarcity. The Online Ser-
vices folder was made less important with the addition of the Internet 
Connection Wizard and the Active Desktop Channel Bar.16 This gave 
Microsoft a chance to play the card game again, and it once again ex-
tracted promises from AOL to benefit Internet Explorer. AOL and Mi-
crosoft executed the Active Desktop Marketing, Promotion and Distribu-
tion Agreement in September, 1997, which barred AOL from promoting 
Netscape within the AOL websites and from compensating Netscape for 
promoting AOL content.17 
This should make clear why the government succeeded in per-
suading the District Court that Microsoft had violated Sec. 2 of the 
Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly. Microsoft was able to distort 
its competition with Netscape by its role as hub by adding content to 
Windows solely for the purpose of buying allegiance. This is not competi-
tion on the merits, as it privileges the position of the central coordinator. 
                                                 
14 See Direct Testimony of Jim Barksdale ¶ 228 (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1900/1999.htm). 
15 See Direct Testimony of David M. Colburn (“Colburn Direct”) ¶ 29 (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2000/2045.htm). 
16 Colburn Direct ¶ 40. 
17 Colburn Direct ¶ 42. 
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Some of these restrictions might have been justified on a pro-
competitive basis given the tricky incentive issues associated with distribu-
tion agreements among a producer and its various agents—and we should 
think of the alphabet entities in those terms. These are principal-agent 
relationships. Microsoft, the principal, engages the OEM or IAP, as 
agent, to distribute its software. Antitrust law recognizes that there is no 
simple way to characterize vertical relationships and so a rule of reason 
analysis applies.18 In this particular situation, we have two principals—
Netscape and Microsoft—negotiating with the same group of agents. 
Vigorous competition between the two principals could result in a rough 
split of the agents, with each principal entering into exclusive agency 
agreements with ten agents. The real issue is the value of exclusive agency 
relative to the value of shared agency. Microsoft didn’t really develop this 
issue, hence the willingness of the D.C. Circuit to accept the lower court’s 
findings.19 
Other restrictions are more difficult to characterize in a pro-
competitive fashion. Preferential access to early versions of Windows be-
tas, for example, is probably about maximizing Microsoft’s leverage of that 
information by creating a sense of advantage and exclusivity from the spe-
cial access. This is the Studio 54 approach to information disclosure: with-
out have-nots standing on the outside clamoring to get in, those on the 
inside feel they have obtained nothing special and of course would be will-
ing to pay nothing for it. Again, this could be a way of disciplining an 
agent—if all get the carrot there is no reason to work for it—but Micro-
soft didn’t make this case out and nothing, other than its sense of self-
interest, prevented Microsoft from distributing these betas to all ISVs. 
Microsoft emphasizes that it has dropped many, if not all, of these 
contractual limitations long before the ruling.20 That said it would be a 
mistake to treat these restrictions as having been unimportant or to infer 
that from Microsoft’s willingness to drop them. We must remember that 
at the point where Microsoft most faced a competitive threat to its operat-
ing system monopoly—when Netscape Navigator held a dominant market 
share and regardless of whether this threat was real or just Microsoft-
imagined—Microsoft used its monopoly power over Windows to tilt the 
competitive process against Netscape. Having succeeded in preserving that 
                                                 
18 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
19 For additional discussion, see Benjamin Klein, The Microsoft Case: What Can a 
Dominant Firm Do to Defend Its Market Position?, 15 J. Econ. Perspectives 45 
(Spring, 2001). 
20 See Comments of Bill Gates at June 28, 2001 Press Conference (available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/jun01/06-28newsconftrans.asp).  
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monopoly by building up Explorer, the contract limits became much less 
important. 
B. Design Monopoly Maintenance 
The claim of monopoly maintenance through the integration of IE and 
Windows is quite different. This goes directly to the question of how the 
software is designed. The claim itself is conceptually straightforward: If 
Microsoft designs software to harm competition and preserve its Windows 
monopoly and not to make better software for consumers, it has engaged 
in monopoly maintenance. The difficulty, of course, is in separating bene-
ficial and anticompetitive designs, and the difficulty of doing so has made 
courts, in the word of the D.C. Circuit, “properly very skeptical” about 
sorting through product design changes. The lower court focused on three 
particular acts of alleged design monopoly maintenance: (1) the exclusion 
of IE from the Add/Remove programs utility; (2) the commingling of 
code for the browser and other parts of the operating system; and (3) the 
use of IE as the browser in certain situations, even when another browser 
had been specified as the default. The court of appeals upheld (1) and (2) 
and reversed on (3). 
Consider each of these in turn. The inclusion of IE in the 
Add/Remove utility facilitates consumer choice. Large-scale corporate us-
ers who want to deny their employees the ability to surf the Internet can 
do so easily by eliminating all browsers. Other large users who prefer 
Navigator and want to eliminate the costs of supporting dual browsers can 
swap in Navigator for IE. The inability to remove IE created the same 
cost-entry barrier for Navigator as was created by the contractual icon re-
strictions, as part of a raising rivals’ cost strategy. In both cases, the pres-
ence of IE meant that OEMs would have to support IE, and this made it 
less likely that they would also install and support Navigator. We can with 
some ease articulate the consumer benefits that would have obtained from 
inclusion of IE in Add/Remove as well as the competitive harms that re-
sulted from the failure to do so. 
But the nature of the after-the-fact looks at product design means 
we have, with the benefit of hindsight, zoomed in on the single design 
decision we think mattered. Before the fact, what should have limited the 
scope of the Add/Remove obligation? This is a question of how much the 
software should be able to be customized by end-users. In buzzwords, this 
is about the extent of mass customization. There is no simple answer to 
this question, but we can say that we want software houses to make design 
decisions on the merits, not on the competitive consequences. The evi-
dence suggests that it was precisely the fact that Microsoft knew which 
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features mattered for competition—the browser and not printer drivers—
that led it to eliminate Add/Remove for IE. 
As to the consumer confusion issue, the actual presence of IE—
meaning its pre-installation on the computer even if in a form invisible to 
the end-user—is probably unimportant—although the district court did 
suggest that hard disk space was wasted. Visibility is what matters as this is 
what triggers the support cost concern, which in turn made it more diffi-
cult to get Navigator installed. This suggests that the fix here is less one 
about design itself and much more about which features are advertised or 
made visible. Eliminate advertising of IE—no icon on the desktop or in 
the Quick Launch Toolbar (the little bar at the bottom with the IE 
icon)—and we take a big step towards solving the support problem.21 This 
is precisely what Microsoft accomplished in its July 11, 2001 announce-
ment that OEMs would now have the option to remove icons for IE from 
the desktop and that IE would be restored to the Add/Remove function.22 
What problems would that leave? Consider the second design is-
sue, the commingling of code for the browser and the operating system. 
The appeals court found that the lower court evidence was mixed on 
whether Microsoft had commingled to impair competition, a result 
Microsoft has challenged in its petition for rehearing. Nonetheless, this 
misses the bigger picture. Consumers have no direct stake in how these 
files are organized. Yes, lumping them together may mean we can’t delete 
parts of the file, but this is barely even small potatoes given the growth of 
disk space. So the direct benefits of deletion are small, and controlling 
visibility is a better instrument for solving these issues than trying to con-
trol directly the assignment of code to particular files.23 
There is a second issue here though, one addressed somewhat 
obliquely by the court of appeals but more squarely in the lower court. The 
visibility solution focuses on the appeals court’s view of the strategic harm 
of integrating the browser, namely that it directly raised the cost of install-
                                                 
21 Microsoft makes this point in its petition for rehearing. See Microsoft Corporation’s 
Petition for Rehearing 2 (filed with the D.C. Circuit on July 18, 2001). 
22 See Microsoft Press Release of July 11, 2001 (available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2001/Jul01/07-11OEMFlexibilityPR.asp).  
23 Do note in this regard that the claim in the case is not that the presence of the IE code 
directly impaired the operation of Navigator. There was some suggestion of this. For 
example, in Finding of Fact ¶ 160, Brad Chase of Microsoft stated that “[w]e will bind 
the shell to the Internet Explorer, so that running any other browser is a jolting experi-
ence.” The claim is one of strategic impairment, not technical impairment. The visibility 
remedy minimizes the strategic impact of the design decision but would do nothing if 
there were a direct technical problem. 
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ing a second browser. Making it possible for IE to be invisible, even if 
present, would solve the support cost problem. It would leave in place 
though a second strategic problem. We need to distinguish the strategic 
consequences of visibility and presence. So far we have focused on visibil-
ity. The mere presence of IE, for “free” as it were—more precisely, in-
cluded with the OS at no separate marginal price—means that Microsoft 
can rely on it for various features, such as the Windows Help system and 
Windows Update, and outside developers can rely on its existence as they 
create their products. That is useful—this is precisely Microsoft’s point 
about providing a common ubiquitous infrastructure—but this also may 
mean that Netscape would be deprived of a chunk of users it would oth-
erwise get. Absent a large enough user base, the economies of scale of 
software may foreclose Netscape from successfully developing its prod-
ucts,24 plus developers may continue to focus on developing for Windows 
directly if the browser market is fragmented.25 
In the extreme case, the OS monopolist might try to foreclose a re-
lated product completely. Try a simple situation to see this.26 Users have 
no interest in the operating system per se. Users just want to surf the web. 
One-third of the users would prefer to do so using IE, one-third using 
Netscape, and one-third are indifferent between the two. Each browser 
runs on top of the operating system, so the OS is required to run the 
browser. There is a fixed cost of $100 to build the operating system and of 
$25 to build each browser. We have 150 consumers, 50 who value brows-
ing with Netscape at $2, and with IE at $0, 50 with contrary preferences; 
and 50 who value browsing at $2 with either browser. (No value is at-
tached to just having the operating system.) 
What would an all-powerful social planner do? It obviously makes 
no sense to build just the OS, as that would cost $100 and create no value. 
                                                 
24 For detailed development, see Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclu-
sion, 80 Amer. Econ. Rev. 837 (1990); Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in 
U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know, 15 J Econ. Perspectives 63 
(Spring, 2001); Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked 
Exclusion, 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1137 (1991). 
25 See Opinion at 39 (“… [W]e conclude that such commingling has an anticompetitive 
effect; as noted above, the commingling deters OEMs from pre-installing rival browsers, 
thereby reducing the rivals’ usage share and, hence, developers’ interest in rivals’ APIs as 
an alternative to the API set exposed by Microsoft’s operating system.”) 
26 This captures in a simplified form some of the ideas in Dennis W. Carlton and Mi-
chael W. Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in 
Evolving Industries, NBER Working Paper 6831 (Dec. 1998). See also Dennis W. 
Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen 
and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 Antitrust LJ 659 (2001). 
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She could build the OS and one browser at a cost of $125, and this would 
result in value of $200, for a net gain of $75. She also could build the OS 
and both browsers at a cost of $150 for a value of $300, and a net gain of 
$150. She should obviously do the latter. 
How should we price this? What price should we charge for the 
OS and for each of the browsers? In this example, with three types of 
identical consumers, it really doesn’t matter. Suppose that the social plan-
ner just wanted to recover fixed costs and leave the consumer surplus to 
the consumers. She could price the operating system at $1 and give away 
both browsers. She could give away the OS and charge $1 for each 
browser. She could do a hundred other variations. 
It is clear what an OS monopolist would do. He would set the 
price of the OS at $1.66. This would permit the monopolist to fully extract 
all of the consumer surplus while just leaving enough value for the 
browser producers to recover their fixed costs. They, in turn, would charge 
$.33 for the browser. The OS monopolist would get revenues of $250, 
each browser company of $25. Obviously, if the OS company is the first 
browser company, its total revenues would be $275 against costs of $125 
for profits of $150.27 
Now change this slightly. Imagine this scenario as being played 
out period after period, where we have new consumers each period, but 
the same products, and, to make matters easy, make it certain that in the 
second period the browser would emerge as a competitor to the operating 
system. Assume if that happens that competition erupts such that all of the 
consumer surplus goes to consumers, and there are no profits going for-
ward for the software producers. 
How would this change the outcome for our social planner? Not at 
all: still build the OS and both browsers and set charges to cover costs. But 
our monopolist would face a different choice. The monopolist could pro-
ceed as before and would get profits of $150 in the first round and no 
profits thereafter. Alternatively, the monopolist could seek to prevent en-
try by the second browser. The monopolist could sell the operating system 
for $2 and give away the browser or could bundle the two together and 
sell at $2. These are equivalent here. 
At that price the monopolist sells 100 copies of the OS and the 
browser: 50 of each to the devotees of its browser, 50 to the different. To-
                                                 
27 This could be seen as a little casual. Once the fixed costs are spent, software in hand, 
we could easily expect Bertrand price competition to push browser software prices to 
zero. The analysis in the text assumes that the entry and pricing decisions are just one 
decision.  
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tal revenues are $200 against costs of $125, for profits, in the first round, 
of $75. In the second round, the monopolist either gets profits of $75 
again, if we think of the fixed costs as being incurred in each period, or 
profits of $200, if not. The monopolist will seek to deter entry if $150 now 
is less than the present value of the stream of profits without the entry of 
the second browser company. In the first version of this hypothetical, the 
OS monopolist wants both browsers produced, as this increases sales of 
the OS. In the second version, assuming modest rates of interest for pre-
sent value calculations, the monopolist will deter entry of the second 
browser to prevent losing the original operating systems monopoly. 
That leaves the third design issue. The appeals court overturned 
the finding below that Microsoft engaged in monopoly maintenance in 
overriding, in some circumstances, the consumer’s default choice of 
browser and instead invoking IE. Microsoft offered a defense of this prac-
tice, and the appeals court saw the plaintiffs as offering no response, hence 
the Microsoft victory. In some ways, the court was too deferential to Mi-
crosoft’s analysis. Microsoft argued that IE had to be invoked when con-
sumers used the Windows 98 Help System or Windows Update, as both 
relied on ActiveX controls not supported by Navigator and on Microsoft’s 
Channel Definition Format, also not supported by Navigator. Even if all 
true, we have design decisions layered on design decisions. If we knew 
that Microsoft uses ActiveX controls in the help system precisely because 
they were not supported by Navigator, this would make the need for IE 
pretextual. This is difficult to evaluate without more information. 
We need a bottom line on design monopoly maintenance. It is 
easy to state the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion: “[a]ccordingly, we hold that 
Microsoft’s exclusion of IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility and its 
commingling of browser and operating system code constitute exclusion-
ary conduct in violation of § 2.”28 It is less clear what this means. Does this 
mean that if Microsoft distributes a feature in or with Windows for which 
there is a competitor—instant messaging, for example—Microsoft en-
gages in illegal monopoly maintenance by making it less likely that the 
competitor’s software will be installed? 
Most narrowly, on the court’s analysis, we should limit this rule to 
features that are possible (likely?) competitors to the OS and to visibility 
and not mere presence. This tracks the court’s analysis in that the browser 
was seen as a potential competitor to the OS by Microsoft, and hence its 
anti-competitive design decisions were clearly about maintaining the OS 
monopoly. The focus on visibility and not just presence matches the view 
                                                 
28 Opinion at 40. 
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that the strategic harm here was the way in which support costs were 
raised if consumers face the choice of using two different browsers. Even 
with the narrow rule, we have the difficult problem of identifying potential 
competitors to the OS. Instant messaging? The RealNetworks media 
player? 
C. Causation and Monopoly Maintenance 
That said, there is little reason to think that this monopoly maintenance 
actually mattered, at least on the government’s theory of the case. The 
court of appeals acknowledged that the causation issues here were tricky, 
but saw the issue as going to remedy, not liability.29 The government saw 
Microsoft as seeking to protect the “applications barrier to entry,” mean-
ing the software ecosystem organized around Windows. Had Netscape 
succeeded in establishing a parallel presence, a new ecosystem might have 
emerged around it. This misses the mark in two ways. First, Microsoft al-
most certainly would have succeeded in preserving its ecosystem simply by 
adding IE to Windows. Fragmentation of the browser market, not mo-
nopolization of it, was all that was required.30 Second, in some more fun-
damental sense, Microsoft was losing by winning. A new ecosystem did 
emerge, the World Wide Web, and that has supplanted the primacy of 
Windows, both as a focal point of attention and as a means of distributing 
software. Placement on the Windows desktop may still be the premier lo-
cation in computer real estate, but it is now just one of many valuable 
locations in a consumer’s virtual space. 
And the paramount role of the Windows CD and desktop as the 
device for distributing software has substantially declined in the networked 
world. As even Judge Jackson realized in rejecting the claim that Micro-
soft had engaged in illegal exclusive dealing, Netscape was able to distrib-
ute tens of millions of copies of Navigator, many over the Internet. In-
deed, ironically, the distribution of Internet Explorer itself made it easier 
for consumers to get Navigator over the net. 
                                                 
29 Opinion at 59-62. 
30 That said, Microsoft itself may not have believed this to be true. As the lower court 
found, see Finding of Fact ¶ 160, Microsoft moved to integrating IE and Windows pre-
cisely because it feared that the contractual restrictions might not be enough. We have 
less direct evidence on whether Microsoft would have thought that integrating IE with 
Windows would have sufficed. 
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IV. Tying 
The D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court on the claim that Microsoft 
tied Internet Explorer to Windows in violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The lower court had found a per se violation, but the D.C. Circuit 
remanded for a rule of reason inquiry into the alleged tie. In doing so, the 
court recognized the “poor fit” of applying traditional tying doctrine to 
software markets. Standard antitrust tying analysis requires that we have 
two goods. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde; Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States.31 Without two goods, by definition, there can 
be no tying of one good to a second good. Hence, the focus on integration 
and separation of software in the District Court and in the D.C. Circuit’s 
Microsoft II.32 
This discussion has little meaning in this context, given the malle-
ability of software design.33 Good software design strives for modularity. 
Breaking up code into discrete chunks facilitates team creation of software 
and maximizes re-use of software. By setting out a piece of code, other 
software developers need not recreate functions in application after appli-
cation but instead can call and use distinct modules. In that framework, an 
“integrated” piece of software is poorly-designed software: it looks to no 
other software for functions and sets forth no functions that other software 
can access. It does not share. In contrast, fully-unintegrated software 
shares well: it takes full advantage of preexisting software modules and 
creates modules available to other software. It would be perverse to tilt our 
antitrust tying analysis in a fashion that pushed towards poorly-designed 
software. 
A. Many Free Goods and Traditional Tying Doctrine 
How should we evaluate tying in this context? Consider the traditional 
formulation of the harms of tying as set forth by the D.C. Circuit: 
Direct competition on the merits of the tied product is 
foreclosed when the tying product either is sold only in 
a bundle with the tied product or, though offered sepa-
rately, is sold at a bundled price, so that the buyer pays 
the same price whether he takes the tied product or not. 
                                                 
31 466 U.S. 2 (1984) and 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
32 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
33 For additional discussion of this, see Brief of Professor Lawrence Lessig as Amicus 
Curiae 20 (filed on February 1, 2000 with the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia). 
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In both cases, a consumer buying the tying product be-
comes entitled to the tied product; he will therefore 
likely be unwilling to buy a competitor’s version of the 
tied product even if, making his own price/quality as-
sessment, that is what he would prefer.34 
We immediately encounter a problem when we apply this to soft-
ware markets: we see lots of free stuff and tying theory doesn’t handle that 
very well. So, for example, is Adobe’s free Acrobat Reader tied to Win-
dows? You could answer this in a number of ways. Yes, it is a free, third-
party complement to Windows, but it is not specific to Windows as Adobe 
makes free versions for a variety of platforms, including Macintosh, Palm 
and Linux. Suppose Adobe made only a Windows version, would that 
change the analysis? We usually think of the tie as being made by one 
company, and not arising through the choice of a third party, so this 
doesn’t square with the traditional doctrine at all. 
Now the question: if free software—or more precisely, a two-piece 
pricing strategy, with a single company selling a mix of free and for-a-fee 
software—is a common software strategy, even in markets we believe to 
be competitive, does this preclude applying tying law to software markets? 
Or should we say that a company with monopoly power in one market is 
barred from giving away free software in a second market, even though 
other companies in that market will give away the software as well? 
As we know from the case itself, this is not a fanciful scenario. 
Netscape gave away versions of Navigator to some individuals, though it 
tried and succeeded in making sales to corporations. Netscape was looking 
to making the browsing market drive sales in the server market, just as 
Adobe gives away its reader to sell the authoring software. In contrast, 
Microsoft was focused on the relationship between the browser market 
and the operating systems market. As Judge Jackson found, Microsoft’s 
entry into the browser market created competition and thereby pushed 
down prices to the benefit of consumers. Moreover, the central concern of 
tying—that the consumer doesn’t use the preferred second good—
vanishes if the second good is free as well. This is free vs. free competition, 
and tying doctrine doesn’t get that. 
A rule that says that a company with monopoly power in one soft-
ware market cannot give away free software in a second market will help 
to push up prices making consumers worse off. This could be a bizarre 
double-whammy. The browser market competition linked competition in 
two markets that might otherwise have been separated, operating systems 
                                                 
34 Opinion at 73. 
Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft  25 
 
and server software. If Netscape had obtained monopoly power in the 
server software market, the anti-free software tying rule would have 
barred both Microsoft and Netscape from distributing free browsing soft-
ware. 
B. Tying as Mandatory Software Coordination 
We should focus instead on software coordination. Impermissible tying 
occurs when an entity with market power attempts to take over coordina-
tion of software sharing on a mandatory basis in a context where it should 
not do so and need not do so. That was a little vague, so consider again 
coordination in the pre-network and post-network worlds. In the pre-
network world, most if not all shared software needed to be provided by 
the centralized hub. The inability to distribute across a network as needed 
and to pay for that software at the same time created a real pressure to 
centralize in the OS and distribute that software upfront. In contrast, in 
the networked world, applications can rely on whatever components they 
choose to, and the Windows Installer reaches out to get them as needed. 
The transaction can take place in real time. Hence, almost no bundling is 
required. Software can be purchased on an as-needed basis. Impermissible 
tying then emerges as an attempt to impose mandatory centralized coor-
dination where it has ceased to be required. 
What does this say about Microsoft’s decision to include IE in 
Windows? We have reached the end of the line, the transition point be-
tween the pre and the post. Incorporating IE was fully consistent with 
Microsoft’s past role as central coordinator of shared software, but at the 
same time, marks the end of the need for Microsoft to play a unique role 
in coordinating software. The D.C. Circuit noted that bundling has vir-
tues in reducing distribution and consumer transactions costs and in facili-
tating shared libraries.35 Precisely so, but the rise of the network changes 
the mechanism for doing this. Pre-network, Microsoft did this through 
Windows; now the always-on network makes it possible to decentralize 
this coordination. 
The court of appeals paid too little attention to this idea in rightly 
abandoning the per se condemnation of tying by the lower court. The 
D.C. Circuit pushes for a rule for reason analysis that respects “potentially 
innovative technological integration.”36 The court focused on precisely the 
right issues regarding software sharing and the issues of coordination: 
                                                 
35 Opinion at 73. 
36 Opinion at 76. 
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For example, the bundling of a browser with OSs en-
ables an independent software developer to count on 
the presence of the browser’s APIs, if any, on its own 
package and thus to omit them from its own package. 
… It is true that software developers can bundle the 
browser APIs they need with their own products … but 
that may force consumers to pay twice for the same 
API if it is bundled with two different software pro-
grams. It is also true that OEMs can include APIs with 
the computers they sell, …, but diffusion of uniform 
APIs by that route may be inferior. First, many OEMs 
serve special subsets of Windows consumers, such as 
home or corporate or academic users. If just one of 
these OEMs decides not to bundle an API because it 
does not benefit enough of its clients, ISVs that use that 
API might have to bundle it with every copy of their 
program. Second, there may be a substantial lag before 
all OEMs bundle the same set of APIs.37 
Well and good, but the more important issue is whether we could achieve 
the same technical benefits of integration or bundling seen by the court—
and for the purpose of coordination these are fungible—with across-the-
network distribution while doing a better job of preserving competition. 
C. Visibility, Presence and Price 
How might we do that? Tying and/or bundling are notions too crude to 
get at the issues in these markets. Instead, we should focus on three more 
textured characteristics: 
o Visibility (or advertising): What software does the OS make visible 
to the end user? 
o Presence: What software is available for use, either through pre-
installation or by invocation across the network? and  
o Price: Are separate charges set out for software or is one package 
offered at a lump-sum price? 
In each case, we need to focus on the costs and benefits of centralized pro-
vision and those of decentralized provision. Taken together, these three 
characteristics create a rich framework for evaluating situations we would 
otherwise lump under the tying/bundling rubric. 
                                                 
37 Opinion at 83. 
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We can now be more precise about our comparison of centralized 
and decentralized software. What should limit the scope of centralized 
provision of visibility, presence and price? The evidence in the case sug-
gests that in the pre-network world, pre-installation was seen as the best 
method of distributing software. Pre-installation meant both visibility 
within Windows—either an icon on the desktop, a spot in the channel bar 
or a line in the online services folder—and presence, as the relevant soft-
ware was automatically installed on the computer prior to delivery. 
As to presence, in the pre-network regime, we can’t install on de-
mand over the network, meaning that we cannot distribute and pay at the 
time that the end-user is ready to use the software. Instead, the software 
must be made available ahead of time, either through pre-installation on 
the hard disk or through availability on a CD. When I needed to install 
the requested Hebrew font, the system asked me to insert my Windows 
Update CD, which was where exactly? There are clear costs to IOD de-
pending on how cumbersome/invisible the installation process is. Installa-
tion off of a CD is cumbersome, especially if this must occur repeatedly. 
The decision to pre-load is essentially a forecast about the expected future 
use of a product, the timing of that use and the cost of IOD. We need to 
trade off the costs of pre-installation—even if in a hidden form only acti-
vated on request (invisible but present)—against the costs of true on-
demand installation. The physical cost of pre-installation is largely just 
hard disk space, which has, with the remarkable progress made in storage 
technology, become less than dirt cheap. 
So, in the pre-network era, maybe we pre-install a bunch of soft-
ware, maybe we don’t, but focus on the question of payment. We need to 
separate pre-installation from the question of whether the pre-installed 
software is paid for as a group. Pre-installation is essentially about the cost 
of distribution vs. the cost of storage. Pricing is a separate question. Again, 
in the pre-network era, it is much more difficult to pay in real time when 
the software is used (either initiating a purchase transaction or a rental 
transaction). So we either bundle large amounts of software based on 
some forecast about consumer demand, or we rely on the consequences of 
large amounts of bundling for collapsing consumer demand valuations.38 
Networked coordination eliminates many of these problems. In 
this framework, the OS emerges as a key place in which software is adver-
tised and purchase transactions are initiated. The real question is how 
hard it is to organize a market in online software. Given the network, dis-
                                                 
38 See Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits 
and Efficiency, Management Science (December, 1999). 
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tribution is easier, if not perfect. What may be harder is the organization 
of payment, though if you have purchased any intangible good on the 
Internet—audio files, for example—you understand that this is reasonably 
straightforward. And some of the difficulties may be solved by the market 
participants themselves. If software package A anticipates a file from soft-
ware package B and that file is missing, networked coordination will allow 
instant downloading, and payment may be made not by the consumer but 
rather by company A to company B. Doing that would insulate the con-
sumer from many of these online micro-transactions. 
As to price, consider three cases: “integrated” software sold at a 
price p; bundled software—bolted software—sold for p; and two “separate” 
pieces of software, the first sold for p, with the second given away. In each 
case, the consumer has access to all of the software and has parted with p. 
Absent a meaningful price for the “second” piece of software—ignoring 
transaction costs—consumers will treat these three situations identically. 
Put differently, consumers would think of the OS as being bundled with 
free complements and would not distinguish integration as a single prod-
uct from bundling with “separate” free complements. 
The antitrust tying analysis turns on distinguishing case 1 from 
cases 2 and 3, though as suggested above, good software design principles 
suggest that we should not try to distinguish these cases. How do transac-
tion costs matter for these situations? Cases 1 and 2 are identical: the soft-
ware is pre-installed and is made visible on the desktop. Pre-network, case 
3 is quite different, as it was quite costly to distribute free software, as 
those of us who use AOL sign-up software CDs for coasters are well 
aware. The rise of the network brings case 3 substantially closer to cases 1 
and 2, though gaps remain. 
D. Three Examples of Free Complement Distribution 
Focus on three real situations and consider the differences in actual distri-
bution. In each case, we are looking at a free Windows complement, and 
the only questions are visibility and presence. In Windows XP, Microsoft’s 
next OS, Microsoft will have instant messaging come pre-installed and 
visible, with no marginal price assigned to the IM component. Obviously, 
this is software that is visible, present and free. In contrast, Microsoft has 
announced that it will not distribute a Java virtual machine with Windows 
XP, but instead will make one available for downloading from its web-
site.39 Microsoft describes the Java code as “a lot of code that many users 
                                                 
39 See John R. Wilke and Don Clark, Microsoft Pulls Back Support for Java, Dealing 
New Blow to Rival Technology, The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2001. 
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don’t need” but that of course is true of most possible features in the OS 
and doesn’t provide a rational for distinguishing the decision on Windows 
instant messaging software and Java. The IM software could just be visible 
through a link for downloading the software for free from Microsoft’s 
website. The only meaningful difference between these two situations is 
that in the one case, the software is pre-installed—meaning installed by 
the OEM for a consumer purchaser—and in the second the software is 
installed over the network. 
Compare the ease of use of Windows IM with that of another free 
Windows complement—one partially decentrally coordinated—the 
Adobe Acrobat Reader. Acrobat is a two-piece authoring and reading sys-
tem. A person using the authoring program “prints” a document to a file, 
creating a portable document that can be moved from computer to com-
puter. This document will preserve the look and feel of the original docu-
ment: it will appear on the second computer as it did on the first computer, 
so long as the recipient has the Acrobat reader program to view and print 
the file. The reading program is free and can be downloaded from 
Adobe’s website; you have to buy the authoring program. 
Acrobat files end in the three letter extension .pdf (thus the reason 
they are frequently referred to as “pdf” files). If you obtain an Acrobat file 
on your Windows 2000 machine and attempt to read it, if you have not 
already downloaded the reader, you will not be able to open the file. In-
stead, a box will open with the heading “Open With …” and you will be 
asked to select the program that you would like to use to open the file. 
This box will come up, because Windows matches three letter suffixes to 
programs, and will have looked on your computer in the table that 
matches suffixes to programs. Since you do not have any program 
matched with that suffix, it will ask you to make the match by hand. 
Unlike pre-installation in XP of Windows IM or pre-linking and 
therefore visibility of Java, Windows will tell you nothing about Acrobat. 
Windows certainly could come with a table matching all three letter suf-
fixes to programs and websites. Suffix tables are readily available on the 
Internet, so this is not a hard problem.40 It turns out that there are multi-
ple programs associated with the .pdf extension. For Adobe, this is its 
portable document format and matches up with Acrobat. For Microsoft, 
this is package definition file, and is used by its systems management 
                                                 
40 See, for example,  http://extsearch.com/, http://filext.com/; or 
http://webopedia.internet.com/quick_ref/fileextensions.html (all visited on July 12, 
2001). 
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server. Windows could offer links to both websites, and you would quickly 
download the free Adobe reader. 
Does this mean that our user will throw up her hands, curse and 
stop? Probably not. For the Acrobat reader, we see decentralized, viral co-
ordination: sites posting .pdf files frequently will also link to Adobe’s site 
making clear how a user gets the free reader. A person distributing an Ac-
robat file can easily solve the linking problem that Windows XP will solve 
for Java but won’t solve for Acrobat. 
E. Pre-Installation Again 
Should we think much turns on whether the free complement is distrib-
uted centrally? Should an antitrust result turn on the mechanics of install-
ing the instant messenger software? The case for doing so would run 
something like this. We can see the advantage of bundling in these exam-
ples. Pre-installation lowers the transaction costs of creating presence, 
though the network has shrunk this advantage. Pre-installation usually 
comes with visibility on the Windows desktop, but this is hardly the only 
method of advertising. Pre-installation also lowers the transaction costs of 
installation. We should expect that if we have two different pieces of soft-
ware, with equal visibility on the desktop, we will see much greater use of 
the software with a presence advantage. So even if we had icons on the 
desktop for both IE and Navigator—or, in the new fight, of Windows IM 
and say AOL’s version of IM—if IE was pre-installed and Navigator 
could be installed by downloading over the network, IE would have a sub-
stantial advantage. Downloading can take forever, and a substantial per-
centage of download attempts fail.41 
                                                 
41 On the liability claims, this leaves outstanding the claim of attempted monopolization 
of the browser market, the third of the violations found by the District Court. One piece 
of this, the alleged June, 1995 offer of market division to Netscape, may have great legal 
significance, but it has zero scholarly significance. Of more interest is the District Court’s 
conclusion that Microsoft’s success in the browser market adds credence to the attempted 
monopolization claim. The lines here between success in legitimate competition and 
attempted monopolization seem especially thin, with severe consequences for getting the 
answer wrong. We will find a violation when we should not, or discourage beneficial 
competition, much to consumer’s loss. All of this is especially troublesome in markets 
that seem to tend to monopoly, so that the new competitor can tip into monopolization 
quite quickly. The court of appeals ultimately rejected the attempted monopolization 
claim based on the plaintiffs’ failure to define meaningfully the browser market or to 
make out significant entry barriers in that market. Opinion at 64. 
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V. Remedies 
The court of appeals well-recognized the difficulty in identifying an ap-
propriate remedy in this case: 
… [S]ix years seems like an eternity in the computer 
industry. By the time a court can assess liability, firms, 
products and the marketplace are likely to have 
changed dramatically. This, in turn, threatens enor-
mous practical difficulties for courts considering the ap-
propriate measure of relief in equitable enforcement ac-
tions, both in crafting injunctive remedies in the first 
instance and reviewing those remedies in the second. 
Conduct remedies may be unavailing in such cases, be-
cause innovation to a large degree has already rendered 
the anticompetitive conduct obsolete (although by no 
means harmless). And broader structural remedies pre-
sent their own set of problems, including how a court 
goes about restoring competition to a dramatically 
changed, and constantly changing, marketplace.42 
As the court itself noted,43 we could obviously just accept the state of the 
market and move on, instead emphasizing deterring antitrust violations 
and could do that through a very large penalty or through private damage 
actions. 
We should start with the remedy implemented by the lower court. 
The Final Judgment in the District Court contemplated a two-stage rem-
edy. The first stage would consist of so-called conduct remedies that origi-
nally were to go in effect in three months. (The District Court ultimately 
stayed this remedy.) The second stage called for the break-up of Microsoft 
into two entities, an operating system company and an everything else ap-
plications company. That remedy was to go in effect only after all appeals 
had been resolved. 
A. The Break Up 
Of course, the appeals court ruling requires a fresh look at the remedies. 
The break-up ruling was thrice damned, first by the partial reversal of the 
liability ruling; second, by the finding that the lower court erred in failing 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the remedy; and third, by the 
conclusion that Judge Jackson’s extra-judicial statements created an 
                                                 
42 Opinion at 10-11 (emphasis in original). 
43 Opinion at 11. 
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clusion that Judge Jackson’s extra-judicial statements created an appear-
ance of bias that infected the remedies phase. 
Although the appeals court leaves the possibility of a break-up on 
the table, it notes that historically divestiture has been used for companies 
that were merged together, so a break up simply takes the pieces apart and 
restores the old situation. Microsoft, of course, was built from the ground 
up as a single company. While it frequently buys software and makes it its 
own—as it did with DOS itself—mergers have played no role in Micro-
soft’s amazing growth or in the dominance of Windows. The D.C. Circuit 
also hinted that there was only a weak causal connection between Micro-
soft’s exclusionary conduct and its market dominance, suggesting that the 
court thought a break-up unwarranted. 
Indeed, the government’s vision behind the break up has never 
been very clear. It seems fair to say that the government felt that it got 
burned in its prior settlement with Microsoft and was loathe to repeat that 
experience. The conduct remedies might give Microsoft wiggle room that 
would render those remedies empty, as had occurred before. The break up 
would also limit the possibility of ongoing monitoring and supervision by 
the government of Microsoft. That is to be applauded, but taking Micro-
soft into the back yard and shooting it would do that as well, yet that 
hardly suggests it is a sensible remedy. 
On a more theoretical level, it is possible to articulate only a weak 
basis for the break up. One concern is that Microsoft has given its in-
house applications developers special information about the Windows ap-
plications programming interface (API), and that cleaving Microsoft will 
eliminate that problem. That is true, but the government made nothing of 
this in the case, so it is unlikely it should play a role in the design of the 
remedy. 
A second possibility is that separation will lead to operating system 
competition. The story would go something like this. The single most im-
portant application is Microsoft Office. Microsoft must consider how deci-
sions for Office alter the position of Windows. Macintosh conspiracy 
theorists have long believed that Microsoft has intentionally delayed Of-
fice for the Mac as a way to weaken the Mac as a competing OS. Indeed, 
as noted above, the government alleged that Microsoft threatened to kill 
off Mac Office if Apple didn’t support Internet Explorer. Separate Office 
from Windows and the applications company will make clean decisions on 
whether to extend Office to other platforms and will not favor Windows. 
Or so the story goes. The reality, of course, is that with Windows 
as the dominant OS, AppCo would almost certainly focus its resources on 
Windows. If we assume that AppCo can’t just scale up immediately so 
Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft  33 
 
that it does face internal constraints, we would expect Windows to con-
tinue to get priority. Any new OS would face the standard chicken-and-
egg problem: developers don’t want to develop for small OSs, and con-
sumers won’t adopt the OS if there are no applications. If this is the point 
of the separation, rather than administrative convenience, it is hard to see 
how this will work. 
B. The Conduct Remedies and Coordination 
What this will also not do is address the key issue of facilitating the transi-
tion from centralized coordination of software sharing to networked coor-
dination. Simply popping Windows into OSCo will not change the ability 
of Microsoft to use Windows to coordinate software sharing. That is a 
good thing if we believe that Microsoft needs to continue to play that role, 
but unfortunate if we can now move to networked coordination. Absent 
controls on Microsoft’s decisions to incorporate features into the OS, it 
can continue to claim that it should be the only seller of shared software 
and can enforce that claim by bundling the software together and selling it 
for a single price. 
That is what must be addressed, and the original conduct remedies 
actually do a much better job of this. Section 3 of the Final Judgment set 
out nine conduct remedies, some with subparts. Microsoft’s proposed final 
judgment set forth five conduct remedies. There was some overlap in con-
cept between the two, even if there was enormous difference in the nitty-
gritty. As is common, these remedies focus on non-discrimination, both as 
among various groups of outsiders (Dell v. Compaq) as well as as between 
outsiders and Microsoft. The remedies also attempt to address overall 
software competition, including dealing with Microsoft’s ability to bundle 
together software, plus possible disclosure obligations for Microsoft. 
1. STRUCTURING SOFTWARE MARKET COMPETITION 
Microsoft distorted the distribution of software through its monopoly 
maintenance; the right remedy for that it is to distort back against Micro-
soft for a period, and then make sure that Microsoft is not able to distort 
distribution again. The presence of the always-on network means that we 
can do this while minimizing possible harms to consumers from introduc-
ing a corrective distortion. A remedy should consist of five central features: 
1. DI Visibility Flexibility. There should be no mandatory icons on 
the Windows desktop or spots reserved in the Start Menu or its 
equivalent. Distribution intermediaries would have complete 
freedom to add or subtract icons from the interface. 
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2. Mandatory Versioning. During the remedial period—see 5 be-
low—Microsoft should be required to issue Windows versions 
with and without any new middleware that it adds to Windows. 
For this to be meaningful, this means that the baseline Windows 
XP could not include instant messaging and the Windows media 
player, but that those features could be included in an upgraded 
version of Windows XP. Microsoft could charge the same price 
for basic and deluxe versions of Windows. 
3. Direct Distribution Only Period. For a moratorium period, per-
haps of six months to 2 years, Microsoft should be able to dis-
tribute through distributional intermediaries only the baseline 
Windows without the new middleware. Microsoft would be able 
to distribute such middleware only through downloading from its 
website or through direct distribution of CDs to end-users. 
4. DI Neutrality. After the moratorium period, we should rely on 
competition among software producers and others for DI shelf 
space—hard disk space for OEMs, web presence for Internet 
service providers and others—to control software distribution 
abuses, and should only seek to control possible abuses of market 
power by limiting conditions that Microsoft can impose on DIs. 
Mandatory versioning would be continued during this second 
period. 
5. Sunset. All of these provisions should sunset, perhaps after a pe-
riod of three years. 
The analysis of bundling above suggests three characteristics of interest: 
visibility, presence and price. These remedies address each of these di-
rectly. As discussed below, in the Final Judgment, Sections 3(a)(iii) and 
3(g) come closest to addressing these issues. Section 3(a)(iii) addresses 
OEM flexibility in product configuration, while Section 3(g) controls at-
tempts by Microsoft to “bind” software to the OS. Before looking at these 
in detail, consider what we should want to accomplish. 
A. Visibility Possibilities 
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft used its control over visibility 
within Windows to disadvantage Netscape Navigator so as to maintain its 
monopoly over operating systems for Intel-based computers. An appropri-
ate remedy should control visibility. We could imagine a range of a possi-
ble approaches here: 
o The Neutrality Trustee. We could appoint a trustee with the power 
to supervise—regulate—the process by which Microsoft puts icons 
on its desktop or application names in folders visible from the Start 
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Menu. Trustees of this sort are increasingly common to implement 
antitrust remedies or settlements; for example, there will be a 
monitor trustee in the AOL–Time Warner merger to manage the 
process of ISP access to AOL/TW’s cable network.44 
o Lotteries. We could try to remove as much discretion as possible 
from this process of creating visibility within Windows. Again, fo-
cus on the inclusion of ISPs in the online services folder. We could 
arbitrarily choose to have ten listed and simply hold a lottery for 
the slots, while allowing secondary sales of the slots. 
o Auctions. Microsoft would simply auction off the ten spots. This is 
very much like the lottery proposal, except that Microsoft gets the 
money that might otherwise flow to lottery winners. 
o DI Visibility Flexibility. We could simply free the distributional in-
termediaries of restrictions by Microsoft, allow them to make 
choices, and assume/hope that competition among the DIs will 
lead to smart choices. A rule of no mandatory icons or folders—no 
mandatory visibility for Microsoft software or services on the Win-
dows desktop—would accomplish this result. Could an OEM pro-
vide a blank desktop? Sure, but it would probably not stay in busi-
ness very long. 
I think one of these —freeing the DIs—clearly dominates the oth-
ers, and Section 3(a)(iii) of the Final Judgment basically embraces this 
idea.45 Interjecting a trustee would make the interface design decisions 
                                                 
44 See U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Decision and Order In the Matter of America 
Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., Dec. 14, 2000 (available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf).  
45 OEM Flexibility in Product Configuration. Microsoft shall not restrict (by contract or 
otherwise, including but not limited to granting or withholding consideration) an OEM 
from modifying the boot sequence, startup folder, internet connection wizard, desktop, 
preferences, favorites, start page, first screen, or other aspect of a Windows Operating 
System Product to— 
(1) include a registration sequence to obtain subscription or other information from 
the user; 
(2) display icons of or otherwise feature other products or services, regardless of the 
size or shape of such icons or features, or to remove the icons, folders, start menu 
entries, or favorites of Microsoft products or services; 
(3) display any user interfaces, provided that an icon is also displayed that allows the 
user to access the Windows user interface; or 
(4) launch automatically any non-Microsoft Middleware, Operating System or ap-
plication, offer its own Internet Access provider or other start-up sequence, or 
offer an option to make non-Microsoft Middleware the Default Middleware 
and to remove the means of End-User Access for Microsoft’s Middleware 
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intensely regulatory and would almost certainly impose law speed as a 
powerful brake on making tech progress. Lotteries or mandatory auc-
tions46 would be less cumbersome, but each would depend on the key step 
of defining the good in question, and that would probably involve a regu-
latory step. In contrast, DI freedom avoids all of this, and so long as that 
market is competitive, should achieve a good result. 
I should note that the more difficult we make it for Microsoft to 
get out its version of the Windows interface, the more likely it will look 
for other means of distributing Windows. Obviously, it does this to some 
extent through direct sales to consumers, but Microsoft could decide to 
vertically integrate and enter the PC business directly. It also could rede-
fine the OS and offer all DIs the same very limited operating system, re-
quiring almost automatic upgrades directly from Microsoft before an end-
user could use a new PC. 
B. Presence Possibilities 
The DI flexibility provision addresses visibility. Consider presence and fo-
cus on three possible approaches to achieving neutral presence: 
o Opening Windows to Others and The Neutrality Trustee. Our neutral-
ity trustee also could have the power to require Microsoft to dis-
tribute third party software with Windows. This would be a form 
of open access regime of the sort debated in the context of ISP ac-
cess to cable lines. 
o Minimal Bundling and Installation over the Network. We could look 
for a common denominator for distribution, and the always-on 
network is a natural choice. If Microsoft wants to add instant mes-
saging to Windows, make it post the code on its website, and let 
users go to that site to download it. This would create greater par-
ity between the Window IM and all of the other versions of IM, 
including those of AOL and Yahoo. 
o DIs. Again, by freeing DIs of Microsoft restrictions, we could hope 
that we would free competition. Microsoft could offer Windows to 
DIs, the DIs could reject it. Microsoft could offer free Windows 
add-ons to DIs, and they could reject those as well. Other software 
producers would compete with Microsoft by offering their software 
to OEMs for pre-installation. 
                                                                                                                         
Product. 
46 Although Microsoft is frequently criticized for the deals that it cuts with third parties 
to distribute their software through Windows, deals for cash, rather than for anti-
competitive benefits, should not be problematic, and would be akin to Microsoft volun-
tarily embracing the auction idea. 
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Consider each of these and start by returning to the bundling dis-
cussion. I suggested there that, even in the networked world, pre-
installation of software might confer a substantial advantage due to re-
duced transaction costs. That means we should look to a level playing field 
for pre-installation and the three ideas above are different approaches. 
The idea of opening Windows to others and putting a government 
agent squarely in the middle of choosing what goes into Windows should 
be self-refuting. This would be a feeding frenzy and coupling that with 
processes that would make a lawyer happy would mean that the next 
Windows operating system would not be Windows XP but Windows 
3000. The Final Judgment sensibly avoided even the hint of this idea, and 
it should not be considered now merely because the break-up has been 
killed off, at least for now, by the D.C. Circuit. 
Less intrusively, we would come closer to achieving competitive 
neutrality and thereby also guard against additional attempts at monopoly 
maintenance if we required Microsoft to live with the same across-
network installation used by its competitors. In many ways, the question of 
whether we want to try to police tying to the OS with the network in 
place turns on these questions about the mechanics of distributing soft-
ware. The analysis cuts both ways. If we think that we might cause serious 
consumer harm by requiring Windows IM to be installed across the net-
work, then we also should think that Microsoft has a competitive advan-
tage by pre-installing it. If we think that it would be a small matter to 
force Microsoft to be an outsider to Windows—to force it to have new 
features downloaded—then we probably lose little by doing so, and this 
has the benefit that third parties now have access to the same tools of de-
centralized coordination. 
If your reaction to this idea is, “You’ve got to be kidding, you ex-
pect me to install my software over the network, using a 56K modem that 
disconnects every 5 minutes,” two responses. First, if that is a serious 
point, you get a good sense of the distributional advantage Microsoft may 
have by simply being able to add software to Windows. Second, you 
should get used to this idea, because the coming world of online software 
services, such as Microsoft’s .Net initiative, is precisely about this kind of 
software distribution. 
On the question of whether pre-installation or downloading mat-
ters, we should look to the behavior of participants in the industry. Cer-
tainly in the pre-network era, there is little doubt that distribution with 
Windows was seen by most industry players as quite valuable. This fact 
drove the card game described earlier. Even now, we should look to Mi-
crosoft’s decisions in including and excluding items from Windows XP as 
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providing valuable information. Microsoft explains the choice to exclude 
Java as in part about irrelevance, in part about contract dispute fallout, but 
it seems clear that the decision is also partially strategic. Microsoft will 
make it harder for Java distribution if Java is unbundled from Windows, so 
that Java is visible from within Windows but must be installed over the 
network. In similar fashion, Microsoft intends pre-installation of Win-
dows instant messenger, not just visibility coupled with downloading. 
These decisions suggest that Microsoft itself believes that something turns 
on the mechanics of distribution, even with an always-on network. 
Finally, consider the third idea, competition at the OEM level. Al-
though Microsoft sells CDs directly to consumers, its main way of distrib-
uting Windows to consumers is through deals with OEMs, who pre-
install Windows before shipping their computers. The OEMs are then a 
key means of distributing software, and we could just look to strengthen 
competition there. We clearly can achieve some of that through remedies 
directed at Microsoft’s contracting practices (see the next section below), 
but the real question is whether we need to control the scope of Windows, 
whether achieved through integration or bundling, and pricing. Manda-
tory versioning, discussed in the next subsection, would address the former 
issue, and, as set forth in two subsections, I am skeptical that the case 
makes out a basis for controlling pricing of Microsoft’s Windows add-on 
components. 
Unleashing the forces of competition at the DI level will be quite 
powerful, as the early evidence, courtesy of AOL, suggests. Press reports 
describe an aggressive campaign by AOL to alter the Windows desktop to 
advertise AOL and to include a series of pop-up notices at various points 
in the user experience as an additional nudge. Besides whatever lump-sum 
payments AOL might make to OEMs, it would pay $35 a head for sign-
ups. Consumer advocates are nervous about this, and Microsoft describes 
the behavior as “anti-consumer,” but this is precisely what we should hope 
would happen, multiplied many-fold.47 
We also need to address direct sales to consumers off of CDs. Mi-
crosoft has no unique distributional advantage there—AOL, among oth-
ers, has demonstrated that it can create CDs with the best of them. Could 
Microsoft have an advantage in obtaining shelf space? That takes us to 
                                                 
47 Facts taken from Alec Klein, “AOL to Offer Bounty for Space on New PCs,” The 
Washington Post, July 25, 2001. See also Rebecca Buckman and Gary McWilliams, 
“Compaq to Give AOL’s Web Service Exclusive Position on Most XP PCs,” The Wall 
Street Journal, July 27, 2001. 
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another complex antitrust area,48 but in any event, nothing in the case as 
litigated really addresses this issue. 
As to presence, I have suggested above a two-period remedy, a 
downloading only period followed by a period of DI neutrality. The core 
notion here is that the central harm of Microsoft’s monopoly maintenance 
was the distributional disadvantage it imposed on competitors. We should 
seek to restore competition and undo the harm created by Microsoft’s ac-
tivities by relatively disadvantaging Microsoft’s distribution.  One ap-
proach that might do that and do the best job of restoring competition 
would be to do both the mandatory downloading remedy and the OEM 
neutrality remedy, in sequence, as described above. Note that the Final 
Judgment makes no effort to remedy directly the consequences of the dis-
tribution advantage created by Microsoft’s behavior. The break-up rem-
edy didn’t get at this, and the conduct remedies ignore the issue as well. 
The suggested two-step distributional remedy gets at this directly. 
It is important to acknowledge that the first stage of this remedy, 
direct distribution only, would likely impose extra transaction costs on at 
least some consumers. Indeed, the point of the remedy is to make it more 
difficult for Microsoft to distribute its software for a period to correct for 
the distributional advantages it obtained from its illegal monopoly mainte-
nance. Whether we should impose the direct distribution remedy or in-
stead just skip ahead to the period of DI neutrality will clearly turn on the 
size of the losses imposed on consumers during the first period, a matter as 
to which evidence might be taken during the new remedies phase in the 
district court. 
The merits of this also turn on one’s sense of how equilibria are re-
stored in distorted markets. Compare two situations. In the first, think of a 
ball in a bowl, where the ball artificially sits on a ledge in the bowl and 
thus cannot come to rest at the bottom of the bowl. Remove the ledge and 
we know that the ball will get to its resting spot, just as it would have had 
the barrier never existed. In the second, think of one ball and many bowls. 
Here the artificial act pushed us from one bowl to another, and in the sec-
ond bowl, the ball sits on the ledge. Remove the barrier and the ball 
comes to rest in the second bowl, but without a nudge, we never get back 
to the first bowl. 
If you believe that just preventing Microsoft from engaging in 
anti-competitive behavior going forward will suffice to restore competi-
tion, we don’t need the direct-distribution-only remedy. Yes, it would also 
                                                 
48 See, for example, Joseph Farrell, Some Thoughts on Slotting Allowances and Exclusive 
Dealing, U.S. Department of Justice, March 28, 2001. 
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act as a penalty, which would help to deter future violations, but we can do 
that directly through monetary fines, and those will not risk disrupting 
consumer transactions. If instead you believe that Microsoft’s behavior has 
pushed us into the wrong bowl, then we need something like the direct-
distribution-only remedy to help to restore competition, and we need to 
make sure that the gains to consumers of doing that exceed the interim 
losses that may be imposed on them. 
C. Mandatory Versioning 
Both the period of direct distribution and the period of meaningful DI 
neutrality depend on the notion of mandatory versioning. Section 3(g) of 
the Final Judgment relies on that as well, so consider it for specificity: 
g. Restriction on Binding Middleware Products to Operating Sys-
tem Products. Microsoft shall not, in any Operating System Prod-
uct distributed six or more months after the effective date of this 
Final Judgment, Bind any Middleware Product to a Windows Op-
erating System unless:  
i. Microsoft also offers an otherwise identical version of 
that Operating System Product in which all means of End-
User Access to that Middleware Product can readily be re-
moved (a) by OEMs as part of standard OEM pre-
installation kits and (b) by end users using add-remove 
utilities readily accessible in the initial boot process and 
from the Windows desktop; and  
ii. when an OEM removes End-User Access to a Middle-
ware Product from any Personal Computer on which Win-
dows is pre-installed, the royalty paid by that OEM for that 
copy of Windows is reduced in an amount not less than the 
product of the otherwise applicable royalty and the ratio of 
the number of amount in bytes of binary code of (a) the 
Middleware Product as distributed separately from a Win-
dows Operating System Product to (b) the applicable ver-
sion of Windows.  
This obviously depends on the definitions49—a matter of substantial im-
portance and dispute—but ignore those for now and focus on the concepts 
at work. 
                                                 
49 Here are the key definitions: 
r. “Middleware Product” means 
i. Internet browsers, e-mail client software, multimedia viewing soft-
ware, instant messaging software, and voice recognition software, or 
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It is important that Microsoft can continue to innovate by making 
features available from the OS. Like the neutrality trustee straw-man set 
forth above, any structure that required pre-clearance of new features of 
Windows would create an intolerable burden on software innovation, one 
that in many ways would track the line of commerce restrictions that 
emerged from the break-up of AT&T.50 In Sec. 3(g), the government 
understood this and avoided that kind of barrier to innovation. 
At the same time, if Microsoft can just continue to add features to 
Windows to be accepted by market participants on a mandatory basis, Mi-
crosoft can repeat the behavior of this case and continue to maintain the 
dominance of Windows. The trick is to allow innovation, while control-
ling what Microsoft can do. 
Mandatory versioning creates the infrastructure to accomplish this 
result. My version of this is different from that in Sec. 3(g) in an impor-
tant way, as I will describe below, but the core idea is similar. We need to 
make it possible for DIs to reject Windows features. Obviously there is an 
important question of scope—which features are we talking about—and 
the elided definitions issue above gets to that. But on the rejection notion, 
only if Microsoft is forced to present multiple version of Windows to DIs 
do we make it possible for features to be rejected. The requirement that 
Microsoft separate out middleware components means that we will not 
end up with Microsoft middleware, visible and present, simply because 
Microsoft controls the content of Windows. Sec. 3(g)(i) takes away that 
                                                                                                                         
ii. software distributed by Microsoft that – 
(1) is, or has in the applicable preceding year been, distributed 
separately from an Operating System Product in the retail 
channel or through Internet access providers, Internet content 
providers, ISVs or OEMs, and 
(2) provides functionality similar to that provided by Middle-
ware offered by a competitor to Microsoft. 
q. “Middleware” means software that operates, directly or through other soft-
ware, between an Operating System and another type of software (such as an 
application, a server Operating System, or a database management system) by 
offering services via APIs or Communications Interfaces to such other software, 
and could, if ported to or interoperable with multiple Operating Systems, enable 
software products written for that Middleware to be run on multiple Operating 
System Products. Examples of Middleware within the meaning of this Final 
Judgment include Internet browsers, e-mail client software, multimedia viewing 
software, Office, and the Java Virtual Machine. Examples of software that are 
not Middleware within the meaning of this Final Judgment are disk compres-
sion and memory management.  
50 For discussion, see Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture 
in Network Industries, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 95-96 (2001). 
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control. This will permit level competition in free middleware software 
components, whether done through the downloading remedy or simply 
through competition at the DI level. 
Mandatory versioning is also important if we want to implement 
the first stage of the two-stage remedy I have suggested. Achieving DI 
neutrality going forward will do nothing to remedy the harms to competi-
tion inflicted by Microsoft through its distortion of the channels of distri-
bution. The natural remedy for that is a corresponding correction, a period 
of distortion against Microsoft. The suggested moratorium period is an 
approach to that. It is inconceivable that we would want to stop all distri-
bution of Windows through DIs for any period. Absent mandatory ver-
sioning, if we just achieve DI neutrality, this would mean that Microsoft 
would distribute Windows XP through the DIs as presented by Microsoft 
to the DIs. 
With mandatory versioning, we can implement the corrective 
moratorium period. Microsoft would distribute the baseline Windows sys-
tems—think of this casually as Windows 2000 or Windows ME—
through DIs. Microsoft could distribute the full Windows XP directly to 
end-users, through its website or via CD. Microsoft’s Windows Update 
feature would facilitate downloading of the add-ons for consumers who 
want them. 
D. Pricing Add-On Components 
Sec. 3(g)(ii) of the Final Judgment will impose a mandatory price gap be-
tween the basic version of Windows and more advanced versions in sales 
to DIs. The impetus behind it is clear. On this story, if Microsoft can con-
tinue to incorporate features into the OS and not offer a separate charge 
for those features, it will make it very difficult for competing features to 
arise. On my story, that may have made sense in the pre-network world 
where it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate distri-
bution of those features from someone other than Microsoft, but it is hard 
to justify in the networked world. 
The problem is that the case as litigated to date does not really 
support a price remedy. Consider the following two scenarios. Assume we 
require installation over the network for “new” Windows functions, such 
as instant messaging. Microsoft announces its price for Windows Basic. 
Users can upgrade to Windows Deluxe by downloading the free Microsoft 
instant messaging program from its website. Competitors can post their 
IM software on their websites, and competition ensues. Consider version 
2 of this scenario where we look to foster competition at the DI level. Mi-
crosoft produces Windows Basic and Windows Deluxe. It sells them at the 
same price to OEMs who choose one or the other. Competitors can also 
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go to OEMs and offer free software for installation, and again OEMs are 
free to accept or reject the software. 
In both cases, Microsoft receives the same payment for Windows 
Basic and makes the additional component available for no separate 
charge. As discussed above, this two-piece pricing strategy—one free 
component, a complement for sale—is common in the software business. 
Sec. 3(g)(ii) would deny Microsoft—and only Microsoft—access to this 
strategy. The government wants the price reduction clause because other-
wise “OEMs, in effect, … pay for Microsoft Middleware Products, even if 
they want to remove them, and thus would provide a substantial disincen-
tive for the OEMs to license and install competing Middleware Products, 
thereby foreclosing opportunities for those products to create competition 
for the Windows platform.”51 
There is something of a sleight of hand here. It is always the case 
in the two-piece pricing strategy that someone “in effect” has to pay for 
the free component elsewhere. But that hardly represents a reason for not 
allowing the strategy, as we would clearly permit it in a competitive mar-
ket. Moreover, in some sense, anyone has the power to set the price of the 
complement at zero. Microsoft can do so, but so can AOL and Yahoo, as 
they indeed have done. 
The D.C. circuit addressed price issues at a number of points in its 
opinion. The lower court did not find that Microsoft engaged in predatory 
pricing, and given that, the court of appeals stated: 
The rare case of price predation aside, the antitrust laws 
do not condemn even a monopolist for offering its 
product at an attractive price, and we therefore have no 
warrant to condemn Microsoft for offering either IE or 
the IEAK [Internet Explorer Access Kit] free of charge 
or even at a negative price.52 
With good reason, as we know that the fear of antitrust liability for low 
prices will interfere with a firm’s willingness to reduce prices, and that is a 
central driver of consumer benefits in competitive markets. Predatory pric-
ing cases are hard to make out generally and that should be especially so 
in software markets where we see even new firms give away their prod-
ucts. Without much more extensive development on the tying remand, I 
                                                 
51 Plaintiffs’ Summary Response, Comment 3.g.[2]. 
52 Opinion at 42. 
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see no basis in the case for the pricing remedy that Sec. 3(g)(ii) repre-
sents.53 
E. Administration and Alternatives 
There have been a number of explicit or implicit lines drawn in the core 
five remedies, and I should discuss those. There are at least three key 
questions: 
o Should the remedies apply to so-called middleware add-ons or to 
all add-ons? 
o Should the remedies look backward, so that we could define cer-
tain functions as add-ons and subject those to the same set of 
remedies? and  
o Are there different costs in unbundling or de-integrating, so that 
removing function visibility and access should suffice without the 
additional step of limiting presence? 
First, the DI visibility flexibility remedy would apply to all icons, so 
that there would be no mandatory icons or other functionality entrance 
points. That would apply to middleware—things we think might have 
platform potential and therefore compete with the OS—as well as other 
new functions, such as Windows XP’s planned “Scanner & Camera Wiz-
ard,” which presumably will not emerge as a competitor of the OS. Al-
though a plausible case could be made out for distinguishing these, the 
administrative costs of doing so probably would be high, and in my judg-
ment, the cleaner remedy is no mandatory icons. 
Second, the mandatory versioning remedy, which in turn feeds 
into the two distribution remedies, would be limited to middleware, how-
ever defined. Differences between the government’s definition and that of 
Microsoft would have to be resolved,54 but the focus is platform potential. 
This presumably would not cover the Scanner & Camera Wizard—an 
item of some controversy.55 Here the right default rule is exclusion, so that 
                                                 
53 There are also mechanical questions about the workings of Sec. 3(g)(ii). When we 
distribute the Middleware Product separately can we do so without shared components 
and the expected components? The royalty reduction is then only calculated based upon 
the unique components that come with the product; this effectively would assign the 
revenues associated with the shared component to the OS. If, in contrast, and this is 
probably what is intended, the middleware product calculation must include all shared 
components, this leaves the royalty as only those components that are unique to the OS.  
54 See Secs. 7.q. and 7.r. of the Final Judgment and Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s 
Comments on Plaintiffs’ Revised Proposed Final Judgment, Comments on Secs. 7.q. and 
7.r. (filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, May 31, 2000). 
55 See July 24, 2001 Letter of Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) to Microsoft CEO Steve 
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we have identified the precise scope of the burden imposed on Microsoft. 
That does have the disadvantage of requiring us to tie down a vision of 
middleware now, but the alternative seemingly is to require Microsoft to 
separate out all new features from Windows proper. Certainly without a 
resolution of the tying claim—and recall that I think Microsoft should win 
that claim as to the browser—there would seem to be little basis for forc-
ing Microsoft to separate out all new features. Put differently, we are enti-
tled to remedy what Microsoft did, but that does not empower us to im-
pose a broad open access obligation on Windows. That said, on remand, 
the district court should conduct hearings to determine the costs of imple-
menting mandatory versioning. The lower the costs of doing so, the more 
we should fold into the middleware category, given the difficulties of fore-
casting what will emerge as a platform possibility. 
Finally, what we learn about the costs of mandatory versioning 
should also help us determine whether we should just live with the 
flexibility remedy and not pursue my suggested distributional remedies. As 
discussed above, this turns on part on the question of how competition is 
restored to a market infected with prior anti-competitive acts. AOL’s re-
cent efforts with OEMs to increase its visibility on the desktop suggests 
the icon remedy itself may be quite powerful, and mandatory versioning 
will clearly impose extra costs. That said, versioning is an extraordinarily 
common strategy in information markets,56 so we should be skeptical of 
the claim that we would be forcing Microsoft to do something that can be 
done only with great difficulty. It is done all of the time. 
2. SECTION 3(G) DETAILS 
While Sec. 3(g) clearly has price consequences, standing alone, it is not 
crystal clear whether this is also a visibility remedy and/or presence rem-
edy. The definition of “End-User Access,” set forth in Sec. 7(j) of the Fi-
nal Judgment, helps to sort this out: 
“End-User Access” means the invocation of Middle-
ware directly or indirectly by an end user of a Personal 
Computer or the ability of such an end user to invoke 
Middleware. “End-User Access” includes invocation of 
Middleware by end users which is compelled by the de-
sign of the Operating System Product. 
Start with the second sentence of the definition. As discussed above, the 
appeals court found that at least some invocations of IE by the operating 
                                                                                                                         
Ballmer; see also John R. Wilke and James Bandler, “New Digital Camera Deals Kodak 
A Lesson in Microsoft’s Methods,” The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2001, p.1. 
56 On this, see Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules Ch. 3 (1999). 
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system were not shown to be anti-competitive steps of monopoly mainte-
nance. I argued that the court paid too little attention to the possibility 
that these design choices, such as the use of ActiveX controls, were made 
simply to exclude the use of Navigator. That said, absent smoking emails 
of the sort seen in this case, it will be difficult to sort out whether, for ex-
ample, an ActiveX control was used in presenting help info on the OS be-
cause it made sense or because it justified the presence of IE on the com-
puter. The second sentence flatly bars Microsoft from designing to any-
thing other than the lowest common denominator—the features sup-
ported by all browsers—and that seems like a serious mistake.57 
Turn to the first sentence. The limit on “direct” invocation of 
Middleware sounds like a visibility remedy. So remove the icons from the 
desktop and take it out of the Start Menu, but leave the underlying soft-
ware on the computer itself. The limit on “indirect” invocation sounds 
much more like a presence remedy, so that, to use Microsoft’s example, 
Intuit’s Quicken could not invoke IE to get supplemental information for 
a consumer from Intuit’s website. To limit indirect invocation means that 
the software either isn’t present or is present but dead to all uses.58 
That makes this both a visibility and a presence remedy. The basis 
for the visibility remedy is the potential consumer confusion issue dis-
cussed by the D.C. Circuit. The basis for the presence remedy is the frag-
mentation rationale, namely, that the presence of Microsoft’s middleware 
will make it much more difficult for competing middleware to gain a suffi-
ciently large user base to cover the fixed costs of software development, 
and that in turn will deter middleware entry.59 Both of these are aspects of 
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusions regarding design monopoly maintenance, 
and do not depend necessarily on how the tying remand is resolved. That 
said, as a remedy for the design monopoly maintenance violation, this 
                                                 
57 Microsoft sought to rewrite this sentence to make clear that it could indeed use IE to 
display the Windows help system, but the government rejected the changes. Compare 
Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s Comments on Plaintiffs’ Revised Proposed Final 
Judgment, Comment 2 on Sec. 7(j) (filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, May 31, 2000) with Plaintiffs’ Summary Response to Microsoft’s Comments 
on Revised Proposed Final Judgment, Comment 7.j.[2] (filed with the same court on 
June 5, 2000). 
58 Again, Microsoft sought a change suggesting that “indirectly” be deleted, see Micro-
soft Comments, Comment 1 on Sec. 7(j), and again the government rejected the change. 
See Plaintiffs’ Summary Response 7.j.[1]. 
59 See TAN supra. 
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should be limited to software that might reasonably act as a platform al-
ternative to Windows.60 
3. QUARANTINING MONOPOLY POWER ABUSE 
Given the core finding of monopoly maintenance, I would expect an im-
posed remedy or a consensual settlement to include the following provi-
sions—all of which are taken from the Final Judgment—to attempt to 
create a structure to constrain Microsoft’s ability to misuse its monopoly 
position: 
o DIs. Microsoft will be barred from taking adverse actions against a 
distributional intermediary for the DI’s actions as to any product 
that competes with a Microsoft product (3(a)(i), 3(d)). Microsoft 
will be required to offer uniform terms for licensing Windows 
(3(a)(ii)). Both of these will reduce Microsoft’s ability to pressure 
DIs to comply with Microsoft dictates. 
o Technical Impairment. Microsoft will be barred from some form of 
taking actions that degrade the performance of competitor mid-
dleware. (3(c).) 
o Agreements Limiting Competition, Exclusive Dealing and Contractual 
Tying. To combat the Apple situation, where Microsoft was found 
to have threatened to kill off or delay Office if Apple didn’t see the 
light, Microsoft will be barred in some form from inducing a third-
party from limiting its development of software. (3(h).) In the pro-
posed final judgments from the government and Microsoft, there 
was conceptual overlap with important difference in details. 
Microsoft would also face limits on its ability to engage in exclusive 
dealing (3(e)) and contractual tying (3(f)). Of course, it was pre-
cisely a similar limit on contractual tying that led to Microsoft II, so 
there is good reason to think this may work poorly. 
As to all of these, the precise details will be difficult, but for better or 
worse, we can expect the remedy here to address all of these issues. 
4. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS 
Sec. 3(b) of the Final Judgment would impose a different non-
discrimination obligation on Microsoft relating to the disclosure of APIs, 
communications interfaces and technical information. The shadow case 
against Microsoft claims that Microsoft uses its superior knowledge of the 
                                                 
60 One more remedy for software market structure should be noted. The remedies sug-
gested by both Microsoft and the plaintiffs would require Microsoft to continue to sell its 
old operating system for three years at a capped price when it released a new OS. 
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insides of Windows to help it write applications for Windows, such as Mi-
crosoft Office. Many of these claims crystallize around the notion that 
Windows has non-disclosed APIs (the applications programming inter-
face), hooks in the software that developers use to share code from Win-
dows itself. Sec. 3(b) would require Microsoft to disclose the APIs and 
other related information to outsiders, just as it does to Microsoft insiders. 
The underlying claim is somewhat interesting. Microsoft is in a 
tricky position in both wanting developers to create applications for Win-
dows and in also competing directly in that market. Developers would like 
assurances that the Microsoft will not disadvantage outsiders in that com-
petition, etc. As a practical matter, it would seem some inside advantage is 
almost inevitable even if Microsoft did its utmost to maintain equality be-
tween insider and outsiders. 
In any event, the APIs allegation has played no direct role in the 
case itself, and therefore as a “remedy” it appears to come out of the blue. 
Microsoft quite understandably sees this as a forced transfer of its valuable 
intellectual property.61 It might be true that disclosure would foster 
competition in the applications market, but that is not what the plaintiffs’ 
case was about. Instead it was about competition in the operating systems 
market, and more particularly it was about Microsoft’s ability to use 
Windows as a device for making visible and present additions to the OS 
that would compete with products such as Navigator and Java. The 
questioned conduct related to integration and tying and therefore as I 
have talked about things, visibility and presence, and not to a use of in-
sider knowledge. I thus see little basis, within the confines of the case 
itself, for a broad disclosure obligation such as that set forth in Sec. 3(b). 
Will this mean that Microsoft will have a sizable advantage over 
outsiders? Probably, but unless we think that the finding of monopoly 
maintenance means that Microsoft forfeits everything associated with the 
monopoly that it lawfully acquired, we need some limiting principle, and a 
tie to what actually animated the case makes sense. In contrast, to prevent 
Microsoft from using API disclosure to third parties as a club, we must 
have the same non-discrimination duty among outsiders that I have al-
ready discussed. Microsoft proposed a version of this in its proposed rem-
edy.62 
                                                 
61 See Microsoft Corporation’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Microsoft’s Comments 
on Their Revised Proposed Final Judgment (filed on June 6, 2000 with the D.C. Dis-
trict Court). 
62 See Proposed Remedy ¶ 6. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I make a number of points about the Microsoft case itself and 
the next steps that should take place. In particular, I argue that: 
o No Liability for Tying. Microsoft should not be found liable under 
the Sherman Act for tying Internet Explorer to Windows. In the 
pre-networked world, Windows played the central role in coordi-
nating the sharing of software. Incorporating a browser would 
have been perfectly consistent with that role. 
o The Drop in the Cost of Software Coordination. The rise of the net-
work changes how software should be distributed and changes the 
role of Windows in software coordination. There is less of a need 
for mandatory incorporation of software into Windows, as decen-
tralized distribution and coordination is now possible. 
o Distorted Distribution Channels. As found by the D.C. Circuit, Mi-
crosoft engaged in impermissible monopoly maintenance. In so 
doing, Microsoft distorted the channels for software distribution 
and added software to Windows for the purpose of raising the cost 
of distribution of rival software. 
o Distribution Remedies. A proportionate Microsoft remedy should 
address that distributional distortion and seek to prevent future dis-
tortions. These remedies should: 
o foster desktop flexibility for distributional intermediaries, so 
that there are no mandatory icons on the Windows desktop or 
spots reserved in the Start Menu or its equivalent; 
o require Microsoft to engage in mandatory versioning, so that it 
issues Windows versions with and without any new middle-
ware that it adds to Windows; 
o impose a moratorium period of six months to 2 years during 
which Microsoft would be able to distribute through distribu-
tional intermediaries only the baseline Windows without new 
middleware, while permitting distribution of the full version of 
Windows via CD or Microsoft’s website; 
o after the moratorium period, rely on competition among soft-
ware producers and others for distributional intermediary shelf 
space to control software distribution abuses; and 
o sunset, perhaps after a period of three years. 
o Equilibria and Restoring Competition in Distorted Markets. The di-
rect-distribution-only remedy will likely impose interim costs on 
consumers. We need to assess those costs and understand whether 
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they need to be paid. That turns in part on whether preventing 
further anti-competitive acts will suffice to create the competitive 
level that would have existed absent Microsoft’s acts, or whether 
such competition can be restored only through a more direct 
measure such as the suggested direct-distribution-only remedy. 
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